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INTRODUCTION 
In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic devastated communities across 
the United States. 1   The deadly disease infected approximately 20 
million and killed more than 300,000 people as of December 31, 2020.2  
In the same year, Joe Biden and Donald Trump competed in the 
presidential election,3 while down the ballot, hundreds of politicians 
competed in House, Senate, state, and local elections.4  In the months 
leading up to Election Day, state officials struggled to implement safe 
 
 1. See Coronavirus in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 
2021, 7:37 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-us-
cases.html [https://perma.cc/AY2R-XGQL]. 
 2. See Cumulative Cases, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. & MED. (Mar. 18, 2021, 6:00 
AM), https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/cumulative-cases [https://perma.cc/5DM8-
7SS7]. 
 3. See Presidential Election, 2020, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Presidential_election,_2020 [https://perma.cc/5SE2-YSYL] 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2021). 
 4. See Congressional, State, and Local Elections, USA.GOV (July 21, 2021), 
https://www.usa.gov/midterm-state-and-local-elections [https://perma.cc/Q6E8-
FDAV]. 
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procedures to facilitate voting.5  Although the majority of U.S. citizens 
have historically voted in person and on Election Day, 6  election 
officials sought to provide alternative access to the ballot box while also 
minimizing voters’ exposure to COVID-19.7   In many states, these 
changes included expanded access to absentee ballots and extended 
early voting, resulting in record-breaking voter turnout in the 2020 
general election.8 
As a result of the November election, Democrat Joe Biden won the 
presidency, and the Democrats maintained control of the House of 
Representatives.9  Additionally, Democrats won 48 Senate seats, and 
Republicans won 50 Senate seats.10  In Georgia, both Senate seats went 
to runoff elections, which occurred on January 5, 2021.11  The runoff 
elections determined the control of the Senate.12  If the Republican 
candidates won one or both of the seats, the Republicans would have 
control of the Senate; 13  if the Democrats won both seats, the 
Democrats would have control, with Vice President Kamala Harris 
 
 5. See Molly Ball, How COVID-19 Changed Everything About the 2020 Election, 
TIME (Aug. 6, 2020, 6:45 AM), https://time.com/5876599/election-2020-coronavirus/ 
[https://perma.cc/9ZDC-77TF]. 
 6. See Drew DeSilver, Amid Pandemic, the Long Decline of In-Person Voting on 
Election Day Is Likely to Accelerate This Year, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 3, 2020), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/11/03/amid-pandemic-the-long-decline-
of-in-person-voting-on-election-day-is-likely-to-accelerate-this-year/ 
[https://perma.cc/3Z8U-ZEDD] (noting that in 1996, 89.5% of U.S. voters reported 
casting a ballot in person on Election Day). 
 7. See Changes to Election Dates, Procedures, and Administration in Response 
to the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic, 2020, BALLOTPEDIA 
https://ballotpedia.org/Changes_to_election_dates,_procedures,_and_administration_
in_response_to_the_coronavirus_(COVID-19)_pandemic,_2020 
[https://perma.cc/N48T-T2GJ] (last visited Mar. 13, 2021). 
 8. See Lazaro Gamio et al., Record-Setting Turnout: Tracking Early Voting in the 
2020 Election, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/elections/early-voting-results.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZV72-WDDN]. 
 9. See Presidential Election, 2020, supra note 3; United States Congress Elections, 
2020, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/United_States_Congress_elections,_2020 
[https://perma.cc/YVV8-3UGB] (last visited Mar. 1, 2021).  
 10. See United States Congress Elections, 2020, supra note 9. 
 11. See Naaman Zhou, Georgia Senate Runoff Elections: How They Work and 
Why They Matter, GUARDIAN (Jan. 4, 2021, 6:04 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/dec/30/georgia-senate-runoff-elections-
guide-how-they-work-why-they-matter [https://perma.cc/BA5K-DHH8]. 
 12. See id. (“When there is a 50–50 tie, the deciding vote is cast by the vice 
president. That will be Democrat Kamala Harris after the Biden administration is 
sworn in on 20 January.”). 
 13. See id. 
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casting the deciding vote.14  Control of the Senate was momentously 
important for both parties.15  A Democratic majority in the Senate 
would enable then-President-elect Joe Biden to provide people much-
needed relief from COVID-19. 16   Alternatively, a Republican-
controlled Senate could block the Democratic agenda, just as it did 
under President Barack Obama.17  Pollsters expected the elections to 
be particularly close and hypothesized that a few hundred voters could 
decide the fate of the Senate.18  In the end, both Georgia Democratic 
Senators narrowly won, giving Democrats control over the Senate.19 
For the November 2020 general election, Georgia’s Secretary of 
State made significant efforts to facilitate early and absentee voting.20  
For example, the state mailed every voter no-excuse absentee ballots 
and placed absentee ballot drop-off boxes all across the state.21  This 
resulted in unprecedented absentee voter turnout. 22   Additionally, 
election administrators opened numerous early in-person polling sites 
to reduce lines and crowding on Election Day, 23  producing record 
voter turnout and showing that early voting was one of the few safe and 
secure voting procedures for many voters.24 
 
 14. See id. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See id. 
 18. See, e.g., Harry Enten, Why Georgia’s Senate Runoffs Are Too Close to Call, 
CNN (Dec. 21, 2020, 7:21 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/21/politics/georgia-
runoffs-analysis/index.html [https://perma.cc/QW3W-V3ET]. 
 19. See Georgia Senate Runoff Election Results, N.Y. TIMES, 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/01/05/us/elections/results-georgia-
runoffs.html [https://perma.cc/HPR6-EZRH] (last visited Mar. 13, 2021). 
 20. See Secretary of State Raffensperger Reopens Grants for Absentee Ballot 
Drop Boxes, GA. SEC’Y STATE, 
https://sos.ga.gov/index.php/elections/secretary_of_state_raffensperger_reopens_gran
ts_for_absentee_ballot_drop_boxes [https://perma.cc/8PVU-CA87] (last visited Mar. 
13, 2021). 
 21. See id. 
 22. See Haley Garrett, Georgia Secretary of State Reveals Record Breaking Early 
Voting, Absentee Ballot Turnout, WGXA NEWS (Oct. 19, 2020), 
https://wgxa.tv/news/local/georgia-secretary-of-state-reveals-record-breaking-early-
voting-absentee-ballot-turnout [https://perma.cc/2UC4-B8LR]. 
 23. See, e.g., Stephen Fowler, Fulton County Launches Massive Early Voting 
Campaign, GA. PUB. BROAD. (Oct. 1, 2020, 2:14 PM), 
https://www.gpb.org/news/2020/10/01/fulton-county-launches-massive-early-voting-
campaign [https://perma.cc/8DJU-JSVN]; Olivia Morley, Board of Elections Firms Up 




 24. See Garrett, supra note 22. 
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Despite the pandemic worsening in the two months between the 
general election and the runoff elections, Georgia election officials 
attempted to eliminate no-excuse absentee voting 25  and restricted 
access to early voting for the runoff elections.26  In Cobb County, for 
the runoff elections, election administrators eliminated 6 of the 11 early 
voting sites that serviced its 537,000 voters.27  Yet, early voting was 
especially important in Cobb County, where voters experienced some 
of the longest early voting lines in Georgia during the general 
election.28  Cobb County had initially planned to have nine early voting 
sites but increased it to 11 after record-breaking in-person voter 
turnout and extremely long lines at the start of early voting.29  Even 
with 11 poll sites, voters waited as long as ten hours at early voting 
sites.30 
To ensure that Cobb County’s new poll closures for the runoff 
elections did not inhibit marginalized voters from accessing the 
franchise, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People Legal Defense and Education Fund (NAACP LDF) and other 
civil rights groups sent an open letter on December 7 (December 7 
Letter) to the county’s election officials.31  The letter asserted that the 
poll site closures “disproportionately impact[ed] Cobb County’s Black 
and Latinx voters and expose[d] Cobb County to litigation.”32  Three 
of the closures were in South Cobb, where many Black and Latinx 
 
 25. See Michael King, Georgia Secretary of State Wants to Get Rid of No-Excuse 




 26. See Vanessa Williams, Voting Rights Groups Alarmed After Cobb County 




 27. See id.; infra appendix. 
 28. See Letter from NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. et al., to Cobb Cnty. 
Bd. of Comm’rs et al. 1, 2 (Dec. 7, 2020) [hereinafter Dec. 7 Letter], 
https://www.naacpldf.org/wp-content/uploads/Letter-to-Cobb-Cnty-re-Reduction-in-
Advance-Voting-Locations-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/VG4R-RRNN]. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See id. (citing Ken Tabous, Voters Wait Up to 10 Hours in Line to Vote in 
Critical Georgia County, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 21, 2020, 4:58 PM), 
https://www.newsweek.com/voters-wait-10-hours-line-vote-critical-georgia-county-
1541132 [https://perma.cc/6SGQ-WJTP]). 
 31. See id. 
 32. Id. at 7. 
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voters are concentrated.33  These early voting changes would make it 
“difficult, if not impossible, for many Black and Latinx voters” to cast 
their ballots before Election Day.34 
Cobb County officials contended that they closed the polling sites 
because they did not have enough poll workers due to COVID-19, the 
holiday season, and the amount of work required.35  However, the 
December 7 Letter indicated that there were enough poll workers to 
staff the early poll sites and offered to help train and recruit additional 
poll workers. 36   As a result of mounting pressure, Cobb County 
officials announced that they would add two early voting sites during 
the final week of early voting and relocate another polling place to 
South Cobb.37  Although the organizations welcomed the additional 
poll sites, they also stated the response was “insufficient,” as Cobb 
County continued to have near two-hour lines and some of the lowest 
voter turnout in the state.38  Importantly, one of the attorneys who 
drafted the December 7 Letter observed that “[i]t wasn’t until there 
was an overt threat of litigation did the county agree to take steps to 
mitigate the situation.”39 
Nationwide, voting rights advocates sent similar letters and threats 
of litigation to protect vulnerable voter populations that did not have 
the resources to litigate their own claims.40  However, recent Supreme 
 
 33. See id. at 4–7. 
 34. Id. at 5. 
 35. See Sanya Mansoor, Georgia Polling Site Closures Reducing Access to Early 
Voting Among Working Class and Minority Voters, Civil Rights Groups Say, TIME 
(Dec. 26, 2020, 6:29 PM), https://time.com/5923898/georgia-early-voting-polling 
[https://perma.cc/QC9F-9FBR] (“In Cobb, elections director Janine Eveler said in a 
statement ‘between COVID, the workload, and the holidays, we have simply run out 
of people.’”). 
 36. See December 7 Letter, supra note 28, at 7. 
 37. See Mansoor, supra note 35. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. (quoting Michael Pernick, an attorney for the NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund). 
 40. See, e.g., December 7 Letter, supra note 28; 2020 Letters to Poll Workers and 
Police Regarding Voter Intimidation at the Polls, ACLU CONN., 
https://www.acluct.org/en/2020-letters-poll-workers-and-police-regarding-voter-
intimidation-polls [https://perma.cc/R5DS-8CJX] (last visited Mar. 13, 2021); 
Advocacy: Letters to Election Officials, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 23, 2010), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/advocacy-letters-election-
officials [https://perma.cc/KUC2-VELR]; Voting Rights, LAWS.’ COMM. FOR C.R. 
UNDER L., https://lawyerscommittee.org/project/voting-rights-project/ 
[https://perma.cc/54RX-W7PU] (last visited Mar. 13, 2021) (“Through coordinated and 
integrated programs of litigation, voter protection, advocacy, and education, the 
Voting Rights Project has had a tremendous positive impact on communities of color, 
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Court opinions indicate that the threat of litigation over election 
administration decisions made close to Election Day will soon be moot, 
even if the claims are meritorious.41 
As a result of the copious changes to election laws made in response 
to the pandemic, there was an unprecedented amount of litigation 
during the 2020 election.42  The Supreme Court, heavily relying on its 
2006 ruling in Purcell v. Gonzalez,43   gave great deference to state 
legislatures to administer the 2020 election.44  This Note explores how 
the Supreme Court has taken the actual text of the Purcell opinion and 
morphed it into the Purcell principle, a bright-line rule against judicial 
intervention in elections close to Election Day.45   This principle is 
based on a desire to prevent voter confusion or upset expectations 
regarding the rules of an election.46  Reliance on the Purcell principle 
creates a gap in judicial protections on the right to vote and leaves the 
door open for abuses of state power.47 
This Note examines the Court’s application of the Purcell principle 
during the COVID-19 pandemic.  Further, this Note identifies the 
implications the combination of Purcell and the state emergency 
powers doctrine pose to future elections.   
Part I explains the Purcell principle by (1) exploring the Court’s 
initial decision in Purcell and (2) examining how courts applied the 
Purcell principle in subsequent cases.  Part I then discusses executive 
emergency powers in constitutional and state law, examines examples 
of recent emergencies affecting elections, and summarizes actions 
states and cities have taken to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Part II analyzes the Supreme Court’s reliance on Purcell during the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  Part II explains the intersection of state 
emergency powers and cases applying the Purcell principle that arose 
during the 2020 general election.  Part II illustrates that the Purcell 
 
low-income communities, youth, people with disabilities, and other traditionally 
disenfranchised populations.”). 
 41. See infra Section II.D. 
 42. See Election Litigation: COVID-19 and Emergency Election Litigation, FED. 
JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/content/350168/covid-19-and-emergency-election-
litigation [https://perma.cc/FU7J-SCXP] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021). 
 43. 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam); see also infra Part II. 
 44. See infra Part II. 
 45. See David Gans, The Roberts Court, The Shadow Docket, and the Unraveling 
of Voting Rights Remedies, AM. CONST. SOC’Y 19 (2020), https://www.acslaw.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/10/Purcell-Voting-Rights-IB-Final-Version.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D3HK-RT2R]; Richard L. Hasen, Reining in the Purcell Principle, 
43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 427, 428 (2016); supra Section I.A.ii. 
 46. See Hasen, supra note 45, at 435. 
 47. See infra Part III. 
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principle is inconsistently applied by lower courts and leaves a gap in 
voting rights protections. 
Part III then calls on the Supreme Court to clarify the bounds of the 
Purcell principle to allow for consistent lower-court application.  
Furthermore, Part III shows the imminent potential for abuse of state 
emergency powers through a hypothetical scenario.  Finally, for 
challenges to election laws during an emergency, Part III proposes a 
new framework that would allow plaintiffs to make a showing of 
egregious abuse of state emergency powers through an 
unconstitutional manipulation of electoral processes.  This Note 
concludes by applying this new framework to a hypothetical scenario, 
demonstrating why the Supreme Court must overcome the Purcell 
principle and state emergency powers. 
I. THE PURCELL PRINCIPLE AND STATE EMERGENCY POWERS 
The development of the Purcell principle over the last two decades 
and its deviation from the process for evaluating preliminary requests 
for relief are crucial to understanding its application during the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  This Part summarizes the scope of state 
emergency powers and gives examples of how the Supreme Court 
analyzed cases regarding emergency powers in the past.  Additionally, 
this Part covers recent emergencies affecting elections and the use of 
state emergency powers to address risks associated with COVID-19.  
This Part also details both the Purcell principle and state emergency 
powers to provide essential context to understanding how combining 
these two concepts is problematic for future emergencies. 
A. Judicial Analysis of Election Laws and the Purcell Principle 
Election law jurisprudence developed over decades as the Supreme 
Court’s understanding of the right to vote and freedom of association 
expanded.48  As the Court’s conceptualization of election law evolved, 
so did the administration of elections.49  This Section summarizes the 
development of the Purcell principle and demonstrates its effect on 
judicial evaluation of election laws close to Election Day. 
 
 48. See generally SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KHAN & RICHARD H. PILES, 
THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS (5th ed. 
2016). 
 49. See Election Administration at State and Local Levels, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/election-administration-at-state-and-local-levels.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/PZ8G-PAKC]. 
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i. Jurisprudence Surrounding Election Laws and Requests for 
Preliminary Relief 
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,50 the Supreme Court stated, “the political 
franchise of voting . . . is regarded as a fundamental political right, 
because [it is] preservative of all rights.”51  Generally, laws that infringe 
on fundamental rights receive strict scrutiny.52  Between the 1960s and 
1980s, the Court applied a strict scrutiny standard to laws that infringed 
on fundamental rights.53  However, in Anderson v. Celebrezze54 and 
Burdick v. Takushi,55  the Court limited its use of strict scrutiny in 
election law cases.  The Supreme Court devised the Anderson-Burdick 
test to balance the competing interests of the individual’s right to vote 
against the State’s justifications for burdening the right to vote with the 
challenged regulation.56 
In Burdick, the Court held that, in considering election regulations, 
a court must first consider “the character and magnitude of the asserted 
injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate.”57  If the court deems the burden 
“severe,”58 then strict scrutiny — not the Anderson-Burdick standard 
— is applied.59  If not, then the court must (1) “identify and evaluate 
the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the 
burden imposed by its rule”; (2) “determine the legitimacy and 
strength of each of those interests”; and (3) “consider the extent to 
which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s 
 
 50. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
 51. Id. at 370. 
 52. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (“We 
have long been mindful that where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under 
the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them must 
be closely scrutinized and carefully confined.”). 
 53. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969); 
Harper, 383 U.S. at 670.  
 54. 460 U.S. 780 (1983). 
 55. 504 U.S. 428 (1992). 
 56. Compare Harper, 383 U.S. at 789, with Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. For example, 
a photo identification law is a burden on the right to vote and a state may argue that a 
justification for this burden is to protect against voter fraud. See Crawford v. Marion 
Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 200–01 (2008). 
 57. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789). 
 58. Compare Crawford, 553 U.S. at 198–200 (characterizing a photo identification 
requirement to vote as not severe given that most voters already possess the requisite 
identification), with Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 581–82 (2000) 
(finding that a California statute severely burdened political parties’ right to associate 
when it forced them to allow voters to vote in their primaries who were not registered 
with the party). 
 59. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. 
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rights.”60  Modern courts use the Anderson-Burdick test to analyze 
election laws that plaintiffs claim burden their right to vote under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments.61 
Many election law cases concern requests for preliminary 
injunctions or temporary restraining orders (TROs) to prevent the 
enforcement of a challenged procedure before an upcoming election.62  
When district courts evaluate requests for preliminary injunction or 
TROs, they weigh four factors: whether (1) the plaintiff has a 
substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the plaintiff is likely 
to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) the 
balance of equities tips in the plaintiff’s favor, and (4) an injunction is 
in the public interest.63  The most important factors in this analysis are 
the first and the second: the likelihood of success on the merits and the 
irreparable harm to the plaintiff absent preliminary relief.64   When 
courts assess a plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits of an 
emergency relief request, they use the Anderson-Burdick test to weigh 
the burden on the individual’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights 
against the state’s justifications for burdening those rights.65  Then, 
based on these factors, the court may issue preliminary relief.66 
If a district court grants the plaintiff’s requested preliminary 
injunction or TRO, the defendant may appeal for a stay pending 
appeal.67  A stay pending appeal prevents the preliminary injunction 
from going into effect before a full appeal is heard.68  A stay is part of 
the “traditional equipment for the administration of justice” and allows 
an appellate court the necessary time to review a lower court’s order.69  
The Supreme Court characterized a stay as an “‘intrusion into the 
ordinary processes of administration and judicial review,’ and 
 
 60. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789. 
 61. See Joshua A. Douglas, A Tale of Two Election Law Standards, AM. CONST. 
SOC’Y (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/a-tale-of-two-election-
law-standards/ [https://perma.cc/K8TJ-Q8GA]. 
 62. See Gans, supra note 45, at 18. 
 63. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 
 64. See id. at 20–21. 
 65. See, e.g., Kishore v. Whitmer, 972 F.3d 745, 749–50 (6th Cir. 2020); Org. for 
Black Struggle v. Ashcroft, 978 F.3d 603, 607–08 (8th Cir. 2020). 
 66. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. 
 67. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009). 
 68. See id. at 426–27. 
 69. See id. at 427. 
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accordingly ‘is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might 
otherwise result to the appellant.’”70 
Typically, the issuance of a stay is left to the court’s discretion and 
depends on the facts of each case.71  When examining a stay, courts 
consider the Nken factors:  
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is 
likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be 
irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will 
substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and 
(4) where the public interest lies.72 
The Nken factors are similar to those for issuing a preliminary 
injunction “because similar concerns arise whenever a court order may 
allow or disallow anticipated action before the legality of that action 
has been conclusively determined.”73  If the district court issues a stay, 
it is essentially dispositive for the outcome of an election law case 
because the appellate court usually renders a final judgment on the 
merits after Election Day. 74   The only chance for an appellant to 
overturn a stayed order is by appealing to the Supreme Court; 
however, the Court would only vacate the stay if the lower court 
“demonstrably” erred in its application of “accepted standards.”75 
ii. How Purcell Altered the Preliminary Injunctive Relief Analysis 
The Purcell opinion changed how courts evaluate requests for 
preliminary relief and stays pending appeal when an election date is 
approaching.  In Purcell, the petitioners filed for a preliminary 
injunction of an Arizona referendum that required individuals to show 
photo identification as proof of citizenship for voter registration and to 
cast in-person ballots on Election Day.76  The trial court denied the 
injunction and did not issue findings of fact or a legal conclusion.77  The 
petitioners filed an appeal with the Ninth Circuit, which issued a four-
 
 70. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Va. Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. Fed. Power 
Comm’n, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958); and then quoting Virginian Ry. Co. v. 
United States, 272 U.S. 658, 672 (1926)). 
 71. See id. at 433. 
 72. Id. at 434. 
 73. Id.  
 74. See Gans, supra note 45, at 16 (“In voting rights and other election law cases, 
the decision to grant a stay may, for all intents and purposes, be outcome-
determinative, at least for the current election cycle.”). 
 75. See Hasen, supra note 45, at 433 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. 
Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 571 U.S. 1061, 1061 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
 76. See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 1–2 (2006). 
 77. See id. at 3. 
978 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVIII 
sentence opinion enjoining Arizona’s law pending full hearings.78  The 
district court then denied the request for a preliminary injunction.79 
The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court, which vacated the 
Ninth Circuit’s order.80  In its analysis, the Court underscored three 
essential elements that the Ninth Circuit should have considered.81  
First, the Court stressed that the Ninth Circuit “was required to weigh, 
in addition to the harms attendant upon issuance or nonissuance of an 
injunction, considerations specific to election cases and its own 
institutional procedures.”82  Next, the Court emphasized that judicial 
orders close to Election Day might create voter confusion, especially 
when courts issue conflicting orders. 83   Lastly, although the Ninth 
Circuit issued its injunction before the district court’s opinion, the 
Court asserted that the court of appeals should have given deference 
to the district court.84  In its final sentence, the Court emphasized the 
importance of the election’s timing and “the inadequate time to resolve 
factual disputes.”85 
The Purcell opinion added a special consideration into the analysis 
for preliminary injunctions and stay considerations for election law: the 
proximity of the election.86  While the Purcell opinion initially deviated 
only slightly from the procedure for analyzing preliminary injunctions 
or stay proceedings,87 subsequent cases morphed it into the doctrine 
known today as the “Purcell principle.”88 
iii. The Development of the Purcell Principle Through the “Shadow 
Docket” 
In Purcell, the Court instructed that special considerations be taken 
into account when a court considers judicial intervention before an 
election.89  Nowhere in its opinion did the Court articulate a hard-and-
fast rule mandating that courts never intervene when Election Day is 
 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. at 3–4. 
 80. See id. at 6. 
 81. See id. at 4–5. 
 82. Id. at 5. 
 83. See id. at 4–5. 
 84. See id. at 5. 
 85. Id. at 5–6. 
 86. See id. 
 87. See Hasen, supra note 45, at 440–44; supra Section I.A.i. 
 88. See Hasen, supra note 45, at 447–52. 
 89. See Purcell, 549 U.S. at 5–6. 
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close at hand.90  Rather, the Court merely stated that the closer an 
election is, the greater the risk that court orders will increase voter 
confusion,91 and cautioned courts that the proximity of the election 
should be a factor “in addition to the harms attendant upon issuance 
or nonissuance of an injunction.” 92   Between 2006 and 2014, the 
Supreme Court cited Purcell in four majority opinions,93 only one of 
which stood for the proposition that “practical considerations 
sometimes require courts to allow elections to proceed despite pending 
legal challenges.”94  Although the Purcell principle was not utilized 
extensively during this period, nonetheless, in 2014, the Supreme Court 
relied on the actual text of the Purcell opinion and morphed it into the 
Purcell principle: a bright-line rule against intervening in elections 
close to Election Day.95 
The Court developed the Purcell principle exclusively through its 
summary orders process.96  The summary orders process, otherwise 
known as the Supreme Court’s “shadow docket,” refers to emergency 
and summary decisions outside of the Court’s main docket of cases.97  
The summary orders process is characterized by expedited hearings 
and hastily decided cases without full briefing.98  These cases are then 
decided with little to no explanation of their rulings. 99   Thus, the 
Court’s development of the Purcell principle through the summary 
orders process provides a weak jurisprudential foundation for the 
doctrine.100 
In the 2014 election cycle, the Supreme Court applied the Purcell 
principle in four cases through the summary orders process.  These 
 
 90. See id. at 5. 
 91. See id. at 4–5. 
 92. Id. at 4; see also Hasen, supra note 45, at 439. 
 93. See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1 (2013); John Doe 
No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010); Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 
181 (2008); Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406 (2008). 
 94. Riley, 553 U.S. at 426. 
 95. See Gans, supra note 45, at 10–15. 
 96. See id. at 3, 10–15. 
 97. See Mark Walsh, The Supreme Court’s ‘Shadow Docket’ Is Drawing Increasing 
Scrutiny, AM. BAR ASS’N (Aug. 20, 2020, 9:20 AM), 
https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/scotus-shadow-docket-draws-increasing-
scrutiny [https://perma.cc/B6KZ-BPD5]. 
 98. See Gans, supra note 45, at 15. 
 99. See id. In contrast, the Court’s normal adjudication process is lengthy and 
meticulous with briefings from both sides and amici. See id. 
 100. See id. at 16. 
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cases come from four different states: Ohio, 101  North Carolina, 102 
Wisconsin,103 and Texas.104  The Court decided these cases without 
issuing accompanying opinions.  Despite the Court not providing 
reasoning and issuing these decisions close to Election Day,105 lower 
courts have subsequently cited these cases as applying Purcell. 106  
These cases are also cited by scholars as cementing the Purcell principle 
in election law jurisprudence.107  Two of the four cases are especially 
illustrative of how the Supreme Court applied the Purcell principle in 
the 2014 election cycle. 
In 2014, the Court relied on the Purcell principle in Frank v. Walker 
when it vacated the stay of a preliminary injunction of Wisconsin’s 
voter ID law.108  In Frank, the district court ruled that Wisconsin’s 
voter ID law violated the U.S. Constitution.109  It held that not only did 
approximately 300,000 Wisconsin voters not have the proper 
identification to meet the ID requirement but also that these voters had 
no easy way of obtaining such identification, putting the requirement 
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment110 and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.111   Thus, it 
issued an injunction of the ID requirement.112  Wisconsin appealed for 
a stay of the order, which the Seventh Circuit granted.113 
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari and vacated the stay, 
restoring the district court’s injunction of Wisconsin’s voter ID law.114  
 
 101. See Husted v. Ohio State Conf. of the NAACP, 573 U.S. 988 (2014) (mem.). 
 102. See North Carolina v. League of Women Voters of N.C., 574 U.S. 927 (2014) 
(mem.). 
 103. See Frank v. Walker, 574 U.S. 929 (2014) (mem.). 
 104. See Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9 (2014) (mem.). 
 105. The 2014 general election took place on November 4, 2014. See United States 
Congress Elections, 2014, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/United_States_Congress_elections,_2014 
[https://perma.cc/N2XW-XGZY] (last visited Mar. 21, 2021). 
 106. See, e.g., Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 977 F.3d 639 (7th Cir. 2020); 
Mi Familia Vota v. Abbott, 977 F.3d 461, 470–71 (5th Cir. 2020); Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y 
of State’s Off., 843 F.3d 366 (9th Cir. 2016); Tex. Voters All. v. Dall. Cnty., No. 4:20-
CV-00775, 2020 WL 6146248 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2020); Eason v. N.Y. State Bd. of 
Elections, No. 16-CV-4292, 2016 WL 11706706 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2016). 
 107. See, e.g., Gans, supra note 45, at 10–12. See generally Hasen, supra note 45, at 
447–56. 
 108. See Frank, 574 U.S. 929. 
 109. See Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 879 (E.D. Wis. 2014). 
 110. See id. at 862–63. 
 111. See id. at 870. 
 112. See id. at 897–900. 
 113. See Frank v. Walker, 766 F.3d 755, 756 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 114. See Frank v. Walker, 574 U.S. 929, 929 (2014) (mem.). 
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The Court offered no justification for its order, which it issued slightly 
less than a month before Election Day.115  Justice Alito dissented from 
the Court’s decision to vacate the stay but conceded “the proximity of 
the upcoming general election” was a “colorable basis” for the Court’s 
action.116  Although the Purcell opinion is not a bright-line rule, it was 
the only Supreme Court precedent at the time that stood for the 
principle that the Court should not intervene close to an Election 
Day.117  Here, Justice Alito clearly stated that the majority’s decision 
was based on the proximity of the election.118 
That same year, the Court again relied on the Purcell principle in 
Veasey v. Perry.119   In Veasey, the petitioners alleged that Texas’s 
voter ID requirement violated the Constitution because it 
unconstitutionally burdened minority and indigent voters.120  In an 81-
page opinion, the district court held that the state intentionally 
discriminated against minorities in violation of the Voting Rights 
Act121  and the Equal Protection Clause. 122   The Fifth Circuit then 
stayed the order and allowed Texas to use the voter ID law in the 2014 
election.123  In its stay, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Texas was likely 
to succeed on the merits because the district court’s stay was issued 
prior to the election.124  Looking at the Supreme Court’s prior orders 
from this cycle,125 the Fifth Circuit deduced that the Purcell principle 
applied in cases brought so close to the election.126 
The petitioners asked the Supreme Court to vacate the stay, but the 
Court refused without explanation.127  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
 
 115. See id. 
 116. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting); see also Article III — Equitable Relief — Election 
Administration — Republican National Committee v. Democratic National 
Committee, 134 HARV. L. REV. 450, 457 (2020) (citing Frank, 574 U.S. at 929). 
 117. See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 5–6 (2006). 
 118. See Frank, 574 U.S. at 929. 
 119. 135 S. Ct. 9 (2014) (mem.); see also Hasen, supra note 45, at 428 (finding that 
the Veasey Court applied the Purcell principle). 
 120. See Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 633–34 (S.D. Tex. 2014). 
 121. See id. at 694 (citing the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. § 10301). 
 122. See id. at 657–58. A Texas Representative admitted that “it was ‘common 
sense’ . . . that minorities were going to be adversely affected by [the voter 
identification law].” Id. at 702. 
 123. See Veasey v. Perry, 769 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 124. See id. at 895. 
 125. See id. at 894–95 (first citing Frank v. Walker, 574 U.S. 929 (2014) (mem.); then 
citing North Carolina v. League of Women Voters of N.C., 574 U.S. 927 (2014) (mem.); 
and then citing Husted v. Ohio State Conf. of the NAACP, 573 U.S. 988 (2014) 
(mem.)). 
 126. See Veasey, 769 F.3d at 894. 
 127. Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9 (2014) (mem.). 
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wrote a dissent criticizing the Fifth Circuit’s application of the Purcell 
principle.128  She highlighted the extensive factual record the trial court 
based its decision upon, to which the Fifth Circuit gave almost no 
deference. 129   Justice Ginsburg noted that this was in direct 
contradiction of the Purcell opinion.130  She declared that the majority 
and the Fifth Circuit had relied on the potential disruption to Texas’s 
election processes, despite a showing that the state implemented the 
law with the intent to disenfranchise minority voters.131 
Although the Court did not explain its reasoning, lower courts cite 
Frank and Veasey when ruling on election laws close to Election 
Day.132  The Court used the summary orders process as the primary 
vehicle to develop the Purcell principle, deciding these cases without 
full briefing or consideration.133  Nowhere in the Purcell opinion did 
the Court assert a hard-and-fast rule that courts should never intervene 
close to Election Day.134   Nevertheless, through these rulings in its 
“shadow docket,” the Court has transformed the Purcell principle into 
a bright-line rule.135 
B. The State Emergency Powers Doctrine and                                         
Its Relevance to Election Law 
This Section explores federal and state emergency powers and 
discusses state emergency lawmaking in the context of election law.  
This Section then focuses on emergency situations impacting elections 
prior to 2020.  Lastly, this Section summarizes state actions taken in 
response to COVID-19. 
 
 128. See id. at 10–12 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 129. See id. at 10. 
 130. See id. (“Purcell held only that courts must take careful account of 
considerations specific to election cases, not that election cases are exempt from 
traditional stay standards.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 131. See id. “The greatest threat to public confidence in elections in this case is the 
prospect of enforcing a purposefully discriminatory law, one that . . . risks denying the 
right to vote to hundreds of thousands of eligible voters.” Id. at 12. 
 132. See Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Off., 843 F.3d 366, 368 (9th Cir. 2016); 
Taylor v. Milwaukee Election Comm’n, 452 F. Supp. 3d 818, 828 (E.D. Wis. 2020); 
Eason v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, No. 16-CV-4292, 2016 WL 11706706, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2016). 
 133. See Gans, supra note 45, at 3. 
 134. See id. at 9. 
 135. See id. at 15–18. 
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i. Emergency Powers in Constitutional Law 
Emergency powers refer to state and federal government’s 
heightened authority to respond to specific threats to public safety and 
welfare. 136   For example, the Constitution delegates power to the 
federal government to deal with specific emergencies such as war, 
insurrection, and domestic violence.137   Congress has the power to 
declare war, raise and support armies, provide and maintain a Navy, 
and call forth the militia to execute the laws of the union.138   The 
President is the commander-in-chief of the military.139  Furthermore, 
each state has its own powers and statutes that deal with 
emergencies. 140   The Supreme Court interprets federal emergency 
powers very broadly in times of emergency, such as during war.141  This 
is known as the “state emergency powers doctrine,” which holds that 
governments have increased power to address foreign and domestic 
emergencies.142  However, after the emergency is over, the Court rolls 
back its extreme deference to the federal government and states.143  On 
this point, acclaimed political scientist Clinton Rossiter once said, 
“[t]here do[es] indeed seem to be two Constitutions — one for war, 
one for peace.”144  The Court’s actions during the Civil War and World 
War II exemplify this,145 as these two wars encapsulate the most drastic 
use of emergency powers by the federal government.146  The radical 
actions taken during these emergencies parallel those taken to combat 
the COVID-19 pandemic in their scope and impact on everyday life in 
the United States. 
 
 136. See A Guide to Emergency Powers and Their Use, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 1 
(2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-
10/2019_10_15_EmergencyPowersFULL.pdf [https://perma.cc/E82E-Q5S6]. 
 137. See William B. Fisch, Emergency in the Constitutional Law of the United 
States, 38 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 389, 390 (1990). 
 138. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 139. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 140. See Legislative Oversight of Emergency, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Mar. 
18, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/legislative-oversight-
of-executive-orders.aspx [https://perma.cc/3BYF-LT56]. 
 141. See Fisch, supra note 137, at 394–96. See generally CLINTON ROSSITER, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF (expanded ed. 1976). 
 142. See Michal R. Belknap, The New Deal and the Emergency Powers Doctrine, 
62 TEX. L. REV. 67, 76–84 (1983). 
 143. See Fisch, supra note 137, at 394–96. 
 144. ROSSITER, supra note 141, at 129. 
 145. See Fisch, supra note 137, at 394–96; see also ROSSITER, supra note 141, at 11–
130. 
 146. See L. ELAINE HALCHIN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., NATIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS 
5 (2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/98-505.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VK8-DEST]. 
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During the Civil War, President Lincoln unilaterally declared a 
general martial law, proclaiming that government military tribunals 
would try and punish all persons “guilty of any disloyal practice 
affording aid and comfort to rebels against the authority of the United 
States.”147  Lincoln also suspended the writ of habeas corpus without 
congressional authorization, citing “public necessity.” 148   Lincoln 
waited three months after declaring martial law and suspending the 
writ of habeas corpus to request ratification of his actions, and it took 
Congress two years to ratify them.149  During the war, the Supreme 
Court did not consider whether Lincoln exercised valid government 
power.150  For example, in 1864, at the peak of the war, the Court 
refused to hear a case of a civilian who was convicted by a military 
tribunal, claiming it did not have appellate jurisdiction over military 
tribunals.151 
Only after the Civil War did the Court review the federal 
government’s actions during the war.  One year after the war ended, in 
Ex parte Milligan,152 the Court reviewed a habeas corpus petition from 
a civilian convicted by a military tribunal in a non-rebellious area 
during wartime. 153   Then, it emphasized the inability of courts to 
adequately consider emergency powers during the war: 
During the late wicked Rebellion, the temper of the times did not 
allow that calmness in deliberation and discussion so necessary to a 
correct conclusion of a purely judicial question. . . .  Now that the 
public safety is assured, this question, as well as all others, can be 
discussed and decided without passion or the admixture of any 
element not required to form a legal judgment.154 
The Court reversed the conviction and criticized the executive 
branch under Lincoln’s unfettered use of military tribunals and martial 
law during the Civil War.155   As a result of the Court’s ruling, the 
jurisdiction of military tribunals is limited to members of enemy forces 
 
 147. Fisch supra note 137, at 412 (quoting VI J. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND 
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 98 (1897)). 
 148. Id. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See id. at 394–95. 
 151. See generally Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1864). 
 152. 71 U.S. 2 (1866). 
 153. See id. at 107–08. 
 154. Id. at 109. 
 155. See id. at 121–27. 
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during wartime.156  Military tribunals are unique in constitutional law 
in that they are exempt from certain amendments in the Bill of 
Rights.157  The Court reasoned that when civilian courts were open and 
able to hear cases and the person tried is a civilian who is not involved 
in military service, Lincoln’s executive war powers did not sanction the 
use of a military tribunal as a forum to try a civilian unconnected with 
the rebellion. 158   The Court thus determined that the government 
denied Milligan his constitutional right to a trial by jury, as he was not 
in military service. 159   The Court stressed the importance of 
safeguarding individual rights and liberties, even in times of war and 
emergency.160 
Going further, the Court rebuked the executive branch’s actions and 
vehemently opposed the idea that the government can declare general 
martial law. 161   Then, it emphasized the potential for abuse by 
subsequent administrations.162  The Court stated that “[w]icked men, 
ambitious of power, with hatred of liberty and contempt of law, may 
fill the place once occupied by Washington and Lincoln; and if this right 
is conceded, and the calamities of war again befall us, the dangers to 
human liberty are frightful to contemplate.”163  Although during the 
Civil War, the Court did not review the federal government’s 
actions,164 after the emergency ended, the Court vigorously rejected 
the power of the government to impose martial law and restricted the 
power of the executive branch during wartime.165 
Similarly, during World War II, the Court deferred to the Executive 
during an emergency but then admonished the government 
 
 156. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., COMPARISON OF RIGHTS IN 
MILITARY COMMISSION TRIALS AND TRIALS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL COURT 10 (2014), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40932.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JM2-ZXCA]. 
 157. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (a grand jury indictment is not required “in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of 
War or public danger”). The Supreme Court also held that the Sixth Amendment’s 
right to trial by jury and right to counsel do not apply to the military justice system. See 
Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 42–48 (1976). 
 158. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121–22. The Court was expressly referring to 
the military commissions set up by Lincoln during the Civil War and not the suspension 
of habeas corpus. See id. 
 159. See id. at 122–23. 
 160. See id. at 123–24. 
 161. See id. at 125–26. “Civil liberty and this kind of martial law cannot endure 
together; the antagonism is irreconcilable; and, in the conflict, one or the other must 
perish.” Id. at 125. 
 162. See id. at 125. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See id. at 125–26. 
 165. See id. at 126–27. 
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afterward. 166   For example, the Court unanimously upheld the 
imposition of a curfew that solely applied to those of Japanese 
ancestry.167  The Court ruled that “Congress and the Executive are 
[not] wholly precluded from taking into account those facts and 
circumstances which are relevant to measures for our national defense 
and for the successful prosecution of the war, and which may in fact 
place citizens of one ancestry in a different category from others.”168  
Although the Court acknowledged the reprehensible nature of a race-
based law, it ruled that the federal government was justified because of 
the wartime emergency.169 
Then, in Korematsu v. United States,170 the Supreme Court held that 
the decision to exclude Japanese Americans from military areas during 
the war was constitutional.171  The Court concluded that the executive 
branch had the power to remove Japanese Americans from their 
homes, even without suspicion of sabotage or disloyalty.172  Although 
there were clear sentiments of racial prejudice in the order and its 
administration,173 the Court stated that the exclusion was justified by 
purely military objectives.174 
However, just after World War II concluded, the Court retracted its 
deferential decisions in Duncan v. Kahanamoku. 175   Similar to 
Milligan, Kahanamoku questioned the constitutionality of the 
conviction of a civilian by a military tribunal established under martial 
law.176  After the attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii declared martial law, 
which President Franklin D. Roosevelt approved shortly thereafter in 
compliance with the Hawaiian Organic Act. 177   Military police 
subsequently arrested Duncan and White for crimes that were not 
connected with military service.178  At the time of their arrests, civilian 
courts were open.179  The Court therefore reversed their convictions 
 
 166. See Fisch, supra note 137, at 395. 
 167. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 104–05 (1943). 
 168. Id. at 100. 
 169. See id. at 100–01. 
 170. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 171. See id. at 215–19. 
 172. See id. at 217–19. 
 173. See id. at 216. 
 174. See id. at 223–24. 
 175. 327 U.S. 304 (1946). 
 176. See id. at 307. 
 177. See id. at 307–08. 
 178. Duncan was arrested for getting into a brawl with two military sentries and 
White was arrested for embezzling. See id. at 309–11. 
 179. See id. at 326–27. 
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and ruled that, under Milligan, the exercise of emergency powers to 
replace civilian courts, capable of hearing cases, with military tribunals 
for civilians not connected to military service is unconstitutional.180  In 
its rebuke of emergency military powers, the Court declared that “[t]he 
established principle of every free people is, that the law shall alone 
govern; and to it the military must always yield.”181 
During times of emergency, the Court is extraordinarily deferential 
to the federal government.182  During wartime emergencies, the Court 
(1) declined to consider whether the calling of general martial law and 
the conviction of civilians by military tribunals were constitutional183 
and (2) upheld a race-based curfew as well as race-based exclusion 
orders. 184   After the emergencies ended, the Court held that such 
actions were unconstitutional.  The Civil War and World War II are 
examples of how the Court used the emergency powers in the past. 
ii. When Emergencies Impact Elections 
Prior to 2020, there were no modern precedents for nationwide 
emergencies affecting national elections.185  However, there are recent 
examples of state emergencies that coincided with elections. 186  
Furthermore, in times of emergency, state officials can use heightened 
authority to respond.187  On September 11, 2001, two planes struck the 
Twin Towers as New Yorkers were heading to the polls for a primary 
 
 180. See id. at 324. 
 181. Id. at 323 (quoting Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 169 (1879)). 
 182. See Fisch, supra note 137, at 394–96. An example of the use of emergency 
powers outside of wartime is the drastic measures taken by President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt to respond to the Great Depression. See Belknap, supra note 142, at 70–76. 
 183. See Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1864). 
 184. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944). It is unclear how 
much of the Court’s deference came from the allocation of constitutional authority 
over foreign affairs to Congress and the Executive, however this Note does not focus 
on this topic. 
 185. See R. SAM GARRETT, SARAH J. ECKMAN & KAREN L. SHANTON, CONG. RSCH. 
SERV., COVID-19 AND OTHER ELECTION EMERGENCIES: FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS AND RECENT POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 12–13 (2020), 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46455/2 [https://perma.cc/8NB5-
MAC3]. 
 186. See id. at 4–9. 
 187. See Election Emergencies, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept. 1, 2020), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/election-emergencies.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/JKK6-H27W]. State officials’ heightened emergency powers in 
regard to elections include suspending or amending statutes, postponing the election, 
and relocating polling places among other things. See id. 
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election.188  Within hours of the attack, then-Governor George Pataki 
issued an executive order delaying the primary.189  Two days later, the 
New York State Legislature passed the Emergency Primary Election 
Rescheduling Act, which postponed the primary until September 25.190  
September 11 may be the most traumatic emergency affecting an 
election in recent U.S. history, but it is not the only one.191 
The most common triggers for state emergency powers near an 
election are hurricane related.192  Hurricane season runs from June 
through November 193  and has substantially impacted elections for 
decades.194  For example, the 2012 and 2016 presidential elections were 
affected by hurricanes.  On October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy ravaged 
the eastern seaboard of the United States just seven days before the 
presidential election on November 6.195  Twenty four states were hit, 
and the Federal Emergency Management Agency issued disaster 
declarations for 225 counties in ten states.196  The majority of states that 
were severely affected by Hurricane Sandy did not provide substantial 
opportunities to vote by mail or vote early before Election Day.197  A 
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postponement-primaries-across-state.html [https://perma.cc/MPD8-BR9U]. 
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Elections, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD. (Sept. 20, 2001), 
https://www.nyccfb.info/law/advisory-opinions/2001-12-effect-new-york-state-
legislature-decision-reschedule-new-york-state/ [https://perma.cc/3TFE-MGE2]. 
 191. See GARRETT ET AL. , supra note 185, at 4–9. 
 192. See id. 
 193. See Tropical Cyclone Climatology, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., 
https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/climo/ [https://perma.cc/X9N6-DAM9] (last visited Mar. 6, 
2021). 
 194. See Adam Howard, How Hurricanes Have Disrupted and Defined Past 
Elections, NBC NEWS (Oct. 6, 2016, 2:26 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/hurricane-matthew/how-hurricanes-have-
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 195. See Robert M. Stein, Election Administration During Natural Disasters and 
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significant number of polling places were damaged by the hurricane 
and remained closed due to flooding. 198   In response, many state 
legislatures failed to provide voters with flexible solutions to vote, such 
as absentee voting or the option to vote early.199  As a result, in the 225 
impacted counties, voter turnout declined by 2.8% on average between 
2008 and 2012.200  Ultimately, Hurricane Sandy was one of the most 
disruptive hurricanes in terms of impact on an election.201 
Hurricane Matthew created a similar problem in early October 
2016. 202   Several states declared emergencies in preparation for 
Hurricane Matthew and ordered widespread evacuations of the 
coastlines.203  Hurricane Matthew hit on October 7, four days before 
the end of voter registration in Florida on October 11. 204   Then-
Governor Rick Scott refused to extend the voter registration deadline 
in Florida despite calls from voting rights groups to accommodate 
voters displaced by the hurricane.205  The Florida Democratic Party 
and other groups filed suit, alleging that refusing to extend the voter 
registration had a “decidedly partisan effect.”206   The district court 
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 199. See Stein, supra note 195, at 68–69. 
 200. See id. at 69. 
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the election. See Sally Bronston, Gov. Scott on Trump’s Tax Returns: ‘Every 
Candidate’s Different,’ NBC (Aug. 7, 2016, 12:25 PM), 
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ordered the Governor to extend the voter registration deadline by six 
days.207   Hurricane Matthew was the last hurricane to interrupt an 
election prior to 2020.208 
iii. State Responses to COVID-19 
Emergency situations, like the hurricanes discussed above, grant 
state and federal officials greater power to address the emergency.  In 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic, many state officials utilized 
emergency powers.209  On January 31, 2020, then-Secretary of Health 
and Human Services Alex M. Azar II declared a public health 
emergency for the entire country.210   Then on March 13, President 
Donald Trump invoked his emergency presidential powers under the 
National Emergencies Act.211  Additionally, all 50 states declared their 
own states of emergency. 212   State responses to COVID-19 varied 
widely, but the vast majority took extraordinary steps to combat the 
deadly virus. 213   They implemented various emergency procedures 
such as stay-at-home orders, criminal and civil sanctions for large 
gatherings, and mandates to wear facial masks.214  These emergency 
actions impacted nearly every aspect of life in the United States, from 
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 210. See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Health and Hum. Servs., Secretary Azar 
Declares Public Health Emergency for United States for 2019 Novel Coronavirus (Jan. 
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 211. See Proclamation 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15337 (Mar. 18, 2020). Section 319 of the 
Public Health Service Act grants the President emergency power, among other things, 
to release funds to state and local governments to combat the health emergency as well 
as suspend incoming international travel to the United States. See Public Health 
Service Act § 319, 42 U.S.C. § 247d. 
 212. See Oren Gross, Emergency Power in the Time of Coronavirus . . . and Beyond, 
JUST SEC. (May 8, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/70029/emergency-powers-in-the-
time-of-coronaand-beyond/ [https://perma.cc/ZX2R-NQNE]. 
 213. See State Action on Coronavirus (COVID-19), supra note 209. 
 214. See id. 
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simple activities like hanging out with friends to complex matters like 
the economy.215 
There are four general categories of gubernatorial emergency 
power.216  In many states, the governor has power over state election 
laws during an emergency.217  Specifically, 45 states have statutes and 
contingencies for dealing with emergencies on Election Day.218  These 
statutes vary greatly from state to state, but most constitute three 
categories of powers.219  These three categories grant (1) the power to 
delay or reschedule an election,220 (2) the power to relocate polling 
places,221 and (3) the power to delay or reschedule an election.222  In 
addition, many states allocate emergency authority to governors to 
suspend or amend statutes.223  A federal statute sets out the date for all 
federal elections, and governors do not generally have the power to 
postpone such elections in an emergency.224  The only instance of this 
occurred in 2018 when Super Typhoon Yutu hit the Northern Mariana 
Islands, and the Governor postponed the election for House Delegate 
from November 6 to November 13.225 
In response to COVID-19, many states implemented or expanded 
voting procedures during the 2020 election cycle.226  The vast majority 
of states allowed voters to cast a ballot by mail, many without needing 
to cite a reason such as disability, physical incapacity, or others.227  
States also expanded access to early in-person voting to reduce the 
crowding on Election Day, and thus the potential to spread COVID-
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19.228  Early and absentee voting saw record numbers of voters,229 and 
these expansions facilitated historic voter turnout in the 2020 
presidential election. 230   Additionally, 19 states postponed their 
primaries. 231   In times of emergency, government officials have 
expanded authority to protect U.S. residents, even during an election.  
Many state government officials used such authority during the 2020 
election in response to COVID-19. 
II. REQUESTS FOR PRELIMINARY RELIEF FROM                            
ELECTION LAWS DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC 
Part II discusses the ways the Supreme Court examined challenges 
to election procedures during 2020.  Section II.A demonstrates the 
Court’s willingness to defer to states early in the pandemic.  This 
Section further explains how members of the Court incorporated the 
state emergency powers doctrine in their analyses along with the 
Purcell principle.  Section II.B examines how lower courts utilized the 
Purcell principle throughout the 2020 election.  Section II.C then 
covers how the usage of the Purcell principle leaves a gap in voting 
rights protections by analyzing an example from the 2021 Georgia 
Senate runoff elections. 
A. The Application of the Purcell Principle                                      
During the COVID-19 Pandemic 
The following cases demonstrate how the Supreme Court applied 
the Purcell principle early in the COVID-19 pandemic.  In Republican 
National Committee v. Democratic National Committee (RNC), the 
Court established the initial framework for applying the Purcell 
principle during the pandemic.232  Merrill v. People First of Alabama 
shows how the Court applied the principle after RNC. 233  Both of these 
cases set the stage for future cases, which ultimately combined the 
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reasoning initially set forth in RNC with the state emergency powers 
doctrine. 
i. Republican National Committee v. Democratic National 
Committee 
On March 24, 2020, Wisconsin Governor Tony Evers issued a stay-
at-home order to stem the spread of COVID-19. 234   Wisconsin’s 
primary was scheduled for April 7, only 14 days later. 235   The 
Democratic National Committee (DNC) and other parties sued the 
Wisconsin Elections Commission in federal court to postpone the 
primary election.236  The DNC asserted that Wisconsin residents would 
face “the extreme burden of literally risking their health and lives in 
order to cast a vote.” 237   Wisconsin citizens overwhelmed election 
officials with requests for absentee ballots, which thousands of voters 
would not receive until after Election Day because the election offices 
could not process them in time.238  Yet, the district court denied the 
DNC’s petition to postpone the election.239  Instead, the court issued a 
preliminary injunction extending the deadline by which absentee 
ballots could be received by up to six days past Election Day, even if 
the ballot was not postmarked by Election Day.240 
On April 6, in RNC,241 the Supreme Court relied on the Purcell 
principle to stay the district court’s order.242  The Court, referring to 
the issue as a “narrow, technical” one, stated that extending the 
deadline for when absentee ballots may be cast was an extraordinary 
departure from the plaintiff’s requested relief and “fundamentally 
alter[ed] the nature of the election.”243  The Court criticized the district 
court for crafting its own relief when it granted the extension of the 
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 243. Id. at 1206–07. 
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receipt of absentee ballots and elimination of the postmark 
requirement.244 
The majority applied the Purcell principle and relegated its 
discussion of the COVID-19 pandemic to just one line in the opinion.245  
The Court stated that it “ha[d] repeatedly emphasized that lower 
federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve 
of an election.” 246   However, this was not an ordinary situation.  
Hundreds of polling places were closed to prevent COVID-19 from 
spreading.247  For example, Milwaukee closed 175 out of 180 polling 
places.248  With only five locations, Wisconsinites who voted in person 
waited in long lines and increased their chances of catching the 
airborne virus.249  Additionally, thousands of Wisconsin voters did not 
receive their absentee ballots on time.250  Thus, the Court’s decision 
forced thousands of voters to choose between not voting and risking 
exposure to the deadly COVID-19 virus to vote in person.251  Justice 
Kagan dissented, emphasizing that the “suggestion that the current 
situation is not ‘substantially different’ from ‘an ordinary election’ 
boggles the mind.” 252   The dissent also noted that “[e]nsuring an 
opportunity for the people of Wisconsin to exercise their votes should 
be [the Court’s] paramount concern.”253 
ii. Merrill v. People First of Alabama 
After RNC, the Supreme Court applied the Purcell principle to 
other cases challenging ballot access and voting requirements.  On July 
 
 244. See id. at 1207. 
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 247. See Henry Redman, Wisconsin’s Closed Polls, WIS. EXAMINER (Apr. 6, 2020), 
https://wisconsinexaminer.com/2020/04/06/wisconsins-closed-polls/ 
[https://perma.cc/5ASB-VFK4]. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Elise Viebeck et al., Long Lines, Anger and Fear of Infection: Wisconsin 




 250. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann (Bostelmann I), 451 F. Supp. 3d 
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2, 2020, in Merrill v. People First of Alabama, the Court stayed an 
injunction of Alabama’s witness requirement for absentee ballots.254  
In Merrill, the petitioners challenged Alabama’s requirement that 
absentee ballots include a photocopy of valid photo ID and be signed 
by a notary or two witnesses, claiming it would potentially force voters 
to be exposed to COVID-19. 255   The district court held that the 
challenge was warranted, and the plaintiffs were right to be concerned 
about COVID-19 exposure.256  Thus, it enjoined the enforcement of 
the absentee ballot requirements.257  On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit 
unanimously refused to stay the order and agreed that the photo ID 
and witness requirements were unconstitutional due to concerns over 
COVID-19. 258   The concurring opinion addressed, but refused to 
apply, the Purcell principle, stating the burden of implementation was 
slight because it only forced the state to accept absentee ballots under 
“relatively minor expanded circumstances.” 259   In her concurrence, 
Judge Britt Grant expressed her concerns, stating that “[t]he Supreme 
Court has emphasized time and time again that federal courts should 
not jump in to change the rules on the eve of an election.”260 
On review, the Supreme Court voted 5–4 to grant a stay of the 
injunction, but it offered no opinion explaining its reasoning,261 making 
it hard to determine why it ruled this way.  However, Alabama’s 
Republican primary runoff election was 12 days after the ruling,262 
which, coupled with the lower courts’ reliance on Purcell, indicates that 
the Court likely relied on the Purcell principle.  This is characteristic of 
the Supreme Court’s other requests for emergency relief that applied 
the Purcell principle.263   Merrill is exemplary of how the Supreme 
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Court addressed election law cases related to COVID-19 throughout 
the 2020 election cycle. 
RNC and Merrill are two of the Supreme Court’s COVID-19-
related election law cases during the 2020 election and illustrate how 
the Court considered these cases early in the pandemic. 264   RNC 
significantly strengthened the Purcell principle, allowing lower courts 
to cite it as doctrine throughout the 2020 election.265  The Court stated 
that it has “repeatedly emphasized” that courts not alter election rules 
close to Election Day. 266   The Court implicated Purcell through 
opinion-less orders in cases like those in 2014,267 but it never explicitly 
directed lower courts not to intervene in elections close to Election 
Day until RNC.268 
B. The Combination of the Purcell Principle and the State 
Emergency Powers Doctrine 
As more cases made their way through the judicial system in 2020, 
the Supreme Court not only relied on the Purcell principle but also 
deferred to state power over election law and state emergency powers 
more generally, which include, for example, the power to protect public 
health and wellness by limiting First Amendment rights.269  Members 
of the Court applied the state emergency powers doctrine in Andino v. 
Middleton270 and Democratic National Committee v. Wisconsin State 
Legislature271  to justify deferring to the state legislatures’ decisions 
regarding election administration during the COVID-19 pandemic.  
 
 264. See generally Clarno v. People Not Politicians Or., 141 S. Ct. 206 (2020) (mem.) 
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 267. See supra Section I.A. 
 268. See Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1207. 
 269. See South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 
(2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (mem.). 
 270. 141 S. Ct. 9, 10 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
 271. 141 S. Ct. 28, 30 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); see also id. at 32 (Kavanaugh, 
J., concurring). 
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Andino and Wisconsin State Legislature thus couple these two 
doctrines to strengthen the Court’s position on COVID-19 election law 
cases.272 
i. Andino v. Middleton 
Andino, similar to Merrill, concerned a witness requirement for 
absentee ballots. 273   South Carolina’s absentee ballots mandated 
another individual witness a voter’s signature on the absentee ballot 
envelope.274  After plaintiffs cited “the unique risks presented by the 
COVID-19 pandemic,” the district court found that the witness 
requirement violated the plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights. 275   The Fourth Circuit initially stayed the district court’s 
order,276 but upon rehearing en banc, vacated that order.277  On review, 
the Supreme Court stayed the district court’s opinion and, like Frank 
and Veasey,278  issued no majority opinion. 279   Justice Kavanaugh’s 
concurring opinion laid out two reasons for granting the stay.280 
First, Justice Kavanaugh reiterated a point Chief Justice Roberts 
made in a different COVID-19 case, South Bay United Pentecostal 
Church v. Newsom:281  “[T]he Constitution ‘principally entrusts the 
safety and the health of the people to the politically accountable 
officials of the States.’”282  Justice Kavanaugh asserted that this logic 
extended to election laws, which “should not be subject to second-
guessing by an ‘unelected federal judiciary,’ which lacks the 
background, competence, and expertise to assess public health and is 
not accountable to the people.” 283   Second, Justice Kavanaugh 
emphasized the Court’s precedent, explicitly citing Purcell and stating 
that federal courts should not alter state election rules close to the 
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 280. See id. at 10 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
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election. 284   This was the first time a Supreme Court Justice 
conjunctively used the Purcell principle and the state emergency 
powers doctrine in a holding.285 
ii. Democratic National Committee v. Wisconsin State Legislature 
Justice Kavanaugh applied this same line of reasoning 21 days later 
in his concurring opinion in Democratic National Committee v. 
Wisconsin State Legislature, 286  which involved a challenge to 
Wisconsin’s deadline for receiving valid absentee ballots. 287   The 
district court granted the petitioners relief in the form of a six-day 
extension of the deadline for receipt of ballots, so long as the ballots 
had postmarks dated by Election Day.288  The Seventh Circuit stayed 
the district court’s injunction on two grounds: (1) the district court 
changed the election’s rules too close to the election, and (2) its ruling 
usurped the legislature’s authority to administer elections. 289   The 
Seventh Circuit cited Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence in Andino to 
support its decision.290 
The Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s stay on October 26, 2020, 
eight days before the presidential election on November 3.291  Justice 
Kavanaugh emphasized the importance of the Purcell principle and 
went so far as to refer to it as “a basic tenet of election law.”292  He 
reiterated that judicial restraint prevents voter confusion, as well as 
confusion in election administration.293  Justice Kavanaugh added that 
“[i]t is one thing for state legislatures to alter their own election rules 
in the late innings . . . .  It is quite another thing for a federal district 
court to swoop in and alter carefully considered and democratically 
enacted state election rules when an election is imminent.”294 
Justice Kavanaugh then emphasized federal courts’ limited role in 
COVID-19-related election cases.295  He argued that the Constitution 
 
 284. See id. 
 285. See id. 
 286. 141 S. Ct. 28 (2020) (mem.) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
 287. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann (Bostelmann II), 488 F. Supp. 3d 
776, 783–84 (W.D. Wis. 2020). 
 288. See id. at 817. 
 289. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann (Bostelmann III), 977 F.3d 639, 
641–43 (7th Cir. 2020). 
 290. See id. at 642. 
 291. See Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28. 
 292. Id. at 31 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
 293. See id. 
 294. Id. (emphasis added). 
 295. See id. at 32. 
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provides “politically accountable state legislatures, not unelected 
federal judges, with the responsibility to address the health and safety 
of the people during the COVID-19 pandemic.” 296   Again, Justice 
Kavanaugh stressed that the federal judiciary should not second-guess 
a state legislature’s decision. 297   He noted the difference in state 
responses to the challenges posed by holding an election during 
COVID-19 and that it was the responsibility of each state’s legislature 
to address such challenges.298 
Justice Gorsuch argued that the district court in Wisconsin State 
Legislature used COVID-19 to circumvent the state’s expressly 
delegated power to run elections.299   In his opinion, he faulted the 
district court for substituting the state legislature’s judgment with its 
own, violating the legislature’s expressly delegated constitutional 
powers. 300   Justice Gorsuch underscored the legislature’s political 
accountability and expertise in dealing with science and safety matters, 
which he felt were better mechanisms for dealing with COVID-19-
related problems.301  He claimed that courts damage the people’s faith 
in the Constitution by acting to usurp the legislature’s role in 
elections.302  While not relying on the nearness of the election, Justice 
Gorsuch still underscored the power of state legislatures to write 
election laws, as opposed to the courts, as his reason for affirming the 
stay.303 
iii. Moore v. Circosta 
Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Alito, relied on the same 
reasoning in his dissenting opinion in Moore v. Circosta,304 decided two 
days after Wisconsin State Legislature.  He stated that, “[e]veryone 
agrees . . . that the North Carolina Constitution expressly vests all 
 
 296. Id. 
 297. See id. 
 298. See id. at 32–33. To emphasize how hastily written this opinion was, it is worth 
pointing out that it contained several errors. See Mark Joseph Stern, Let’s Count All 
the Errors and Lies in Brett Kavanaugh’s Defense of Voter Suppression, SLATE (Oct. 
27, 2020, 4:17 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/10/brett-kavanaugh-voter-
suppression-wisconsin-mistakes.html [https://perma.cc/Q5N7-489G]. 
 299. See Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. at 28–29 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 300. See id. at 29 (“The Constitution provides that State legislatures — not federal 
judges, not state judges, not state governors, not other state officials — bear primary 
responsibility for setting election rules.”). 
 301. See id. 
 302. See id. at 30. 
 303. See id. at 29. 
 304. 141 S. Ct. 46, 47 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
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legislative power in the General Assembly, not the Board or anyone 
else.”305  Justice Gorsuch then cited his concurrence in Wisconsin State 
Legislature to reiterate the legislature’s preeminence in administering 
elections during COVID-19.306 
Lastly, it is important to note that neither Justice Kavanaugh nor 
Justice Gorsuch went through the traditional framework for staying 
orders or vacating a stay of lower courts in these cases.307   Justice 
Kavanaugh’s concurrence in Andino ignored the Nken factors308 and 
relied solely on the Purcell principle and state emergency powers.309  In 
Wisconsin State Legislature, he did not consider any of the factors 
required for evaluating whether to vacate the Seventh Circuit’s stay.310  
Similarly, in his Wisconsin State Legislature concurrence, Justice 
Gorsuch relied solely on the accountability of the legislature and the 
Constitution’s explicit delegation to states to administer elections.311 
iv. Looking Back at RNC and Merrill 
The Court’s first COVID-19 election law case, RNC, lacked the state 
emergency powers justification and relied solely on the election’s 
proximity. 312   The majority characterized the case as a “narrow, 
technical question.”313  The dissent argued, “[w]ith the majority’s stay 
in place, . . . [voters] will have to brave the polls, endangering their own 
and others’ safety.  Or they will lose their right to vote, through no fault 
of their own.”314  At least 52 people were infected with COVID-19 as 
a result of voting in person in the Wisconsin primary election.315  The 
 
 305. Id. at 47. 
 306. See id. 
 307. See generally Andino v. Middleton, 141 S. Ct. 9 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., 
concurring); Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 28–30 
(2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. at 30–40 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
 308. See supra Section I.A.i. 
 309. See Andino, 141 S. Ct. at 9. 
 310. See Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. at 30–40. For discussion of the factors for 
evaluating whether to vacate a stay, see Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical 
Health Servs. v. Abbott, 571 U.S. 1061, 1061 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 311. See Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. at 28–30. 
 312. See Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207 
(2020). 
 313. Id. at 1206. 
 314. Id. at 1211 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 315. See Scott Bauer, 52 Who Worked or Voted in Wisconsin Election Have 
COVID-19, ABC NEWS (Apr. 29, 2020, 7:03 PM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory/52-worked-voted-wisconsin-election-covid-
19-70406317 [https://perma.cc/5MW7-ZPQ3]. 
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voter confusion and difficulty in implementing court orders close to the 
date of the election triumphed, in the Court’s eyes, over the confusion 
and fear of voters the pandemic caused.316 
The concurring opinions in Andino and Wisconsin State Legislature 
may be reactions to RNC.317  Justice Kavanaugh weighed the tension 
between the power expressly delegated to the states to run elections 
and the states’ power to address public health crises against the courts’ 
power to remedy harms to voters’ rights. 318   Meanwhile, Justice 
Gorsuch was primarily concerned with lower courts supplanting the 
constitutionally prescribed role of state legislatures’ power over 
election administration and deferred to state legislatures’ decisions 
regarding the COVID-19 pandemic.319 
Looking at Merrill through this lens changes the context of the 
Supreme Court’s order.320   The Court potentially took the view — 
although it is hard to be certain without a written opinion — that the 
Alabama legislature considered the risks associated with COVID-19 
and weighed it against the integrity of the election.  The legislature then 
affirmatively decided not to change the witness requirement for 
absentee ballots and, according to the Court, this must be given 
deference under the state emergency powers doctrine in addition to the 
Purcell principle.321  This deference comes despite the burden on the 
right to vote that the witness requirement poses in light of the COVID-
19 pandemic.322  Thousands of Alabamans voted by mail and requiring 
a witness to sign the ballots potentially exposed them to COVID-19.323  
Justice Kavanaugh did not write an opinion in Merrill, but he may have 
 
 316. See Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1205–08 (majority opinion). 
 317. See generally Andino v. Middleton, 141 S. Ct. 9, 9 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., 
concurring); Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 28–30 
(2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. at 30–40 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
 318. See Andino, 141 S. Ct. at 9 (2020); Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. at 30–40. 
 319. See Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. at 28–30 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 320. See Merrill v. People First of Ala., 141 S. Ct. 190 (2020) (mem.). 
 321. See supra Section II.B. 
 322. See, e.g., Yelena Dzhanova, Some Voters Are Scared the Coronavirus Will 
Stop Them from Casting a Ballot, CNBC (June 1, 2020, 4:01 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/01/some-voters-are-scared-coronavirus-will-stop-them-
from-casting-ballot.html [https://perma.cc/M5P6-7FTN]. 
 323. See Madeleine Carlisle & Abigail Abrams, The Supreme Court’s Alabama 
Ruling Could Disenfranchise Thousands of High Risk Voters, TIME (Oct. 23, 2020, 
3:45 PM), https://time.com/5903449/supreme-court-restricts-voting-alabama/ 
[https://perma.cc/XSH7-WAXM]. 
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evaluated Andino similarly.324  Without an opinion to accompany the 
order in Merrill, it is impossible to tell exactly how the Court 
considered it.  Nevertheless, the addition of the state emergency 
powers doctrine and legislature’s power over election administration 
to the Purcell principle adds a stronger justification to the Court’s 
reasoning in these cases. 
C. Lower Court Usage of the Purcell Principle 
During the 2020 election cycle, over 70 district courts cited either the 
Purcell opinion or the Purcell principle’s explication in RNC. 325  
Circuit courts stayed a preliminary injunction or refused to grant one 
and sided with the state in nearly every one of the 30 appealed 
decisions. 326   The majority of circuit courts relied on the Purcell 
principle in their ultimate conclusions.327  Only four appellate courts 
sided with the plaintiffs because the state either settled,328 offered no 
legal resistance, 329  or filed its appeal too late for relief. 330   One 
appellate court sided with the plaintiffs only to be reversed by the 
 
 324. Compare People First of Ala., 467 F. Supp. 3d at 1191–97, with Middleton v. 
Andino, 488 F. Supp. 3d 261, 271–76 (D.S.C. 2020). 
 325. For a search of cases citing Purcell v. Gonzalez during the 2020 election, see 
WESTLAW, https://1.next.westlaw.com (search “549 U.S. 1”; follow the “Citing 
References” hyperlink; filter cases by date from Jan. 1, 2020 to Dec. 31, 2020 and non-
Supreme Court Cases). For a search of cases citing Republican Nat’l Comm. v. 
Democratic Nat’l Comm. during the 2020 election, see WESTLAW, 
https://1.next.westlaw.com (search “140 S. Ct. 1205”; follow the “Citing References” 
hyperlink; filter cases by non-Supreme Court Cases). 
 326. See, e.g., Esshaki v. Whitmer, 813 F. App’x 170, 171–73 (6th Cir. 2020) (ruling 
that a political candidate’s ballot access was unconstitutionally burdened because he 
would have to gather signatures in violation of a stay-at-home order, but staying the 
preliminary injunction in part because it overrode the state’s power to administer 
elections); Org. for Black Struggle v. Ashcroft, 978 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 2020) (refusing 
to grant a temporary restraining order on Tennessee’s absentee ballot procedures, 
which plaintiff alleged were treated differently than mail-in ballots in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 327. See, e.g., Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott, 961 F.3d 389, 411–12 (5th Cir. 2020); 
Tully v. Okeson, 977 F.3d 608, 618 (7th Cir. 2020); New Ga. Project v. Raffensperger, 
976 F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2020). 
 328. See Common Cause R.I. v. Gorbea, 970 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2020) (rejecting an 
intervening motion by Republican Party organizations for stay because defendants 
settled with plaintiffs). 
 329. See Libertarian Party of Ill. v. Cadigan, 824 F. App’x 415 (7th Cir. 2020) 
(allowing the preliminary relief to stand because the defendants originally consented 
to the court order but then later filed appeal to stay the injunction). 
 330. See Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett, 977 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2020) 
(refusing to stay a preliminary injunction of absentee ballot procedures because the 
appeal was filed after absentee voting began). 
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Supreme Court.331  Two of these cases arose after Election Day on 
November 3, 2020, 332 which is patently different than when an election 
is imminent.  The courts applied a bright-line rule to these cases and 
failed to consider them on the merits.333  Many of these cases were 
highly politicized, with both the Republican and Democratic parties 
initiating or intervening in the majority of cases.334 
The circuit courts showed enormous deference to the state 
justifications when applying the Nken factors.335   As noted above, 
almost none of the cases sided with plaintiffs when considering a stay 
pending appeal absent other unique considerations. 336   The circuit 
courts weighed the interests of the state in administering the election 
during COVID-19 extraordinarily heavily when balancing the stay 
factors.337  Although these cases applied the Purcell principle, it was 
not consistently applied in the same manner among the circuit 
courts. 338   Some cases applied the Purcell principle under the 
“likelihood of success on the merits” factors.339  Other cases applied 
the Purcell principle when considering whether the state would be 
irreparably harmed absent a stay of the preliminary injunction.340  Still, 
others applied it when considering the balance of equities or public 
 
 331. See People First of Ala. v. Sec’y of State for Ala., 815 F. App’x 505 (11th Cir. 
2020), vacated, Merrill v. People First of Ala., 141 S. Ct. 190 (2020). 
 332. See Bognet v. Sec’y Commonwealth of Pa., 980 F.3d 336 (3d. Cir. 2020); Trump 
v. Wis. Elections Comm’n, 983 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. 2020). 
 333. Compare Common Cause R.I., 970 F.3d at 16–17 (1st Cir. 2020), with Mi 
Familia Vota v. Abbott, 834 F. App’x 860, 862 (5th Cir. 2020), and Tully v. Okeson, 
977 F.3d 608, 612–13 (7th Cir. 2020). 
 334. See generally Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 
1205 (2020) (per curiam); Common Cause R.I., 970 F.3d at 16–17 (noting the decision 
only appealed by intervening Republican Party, which sought to overrule settlement 
between plaintiffs and election officials). 
 335. See, e.g., Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott, 961 F.3d 389, 393–94 (5th Cir. 2020) 
(deferring specifically to the state legislature’s emergency powers to run elections); 
Tully, 977 F.3d at 615–16 (applying rational basis review instead of the Anderson-
Burdick test when assessing the appellants likelihood of success on the merits). 
 336. See, e.g., Kishore v. Whitmer, 972 F.3d 745 (6th Cir. 2020) (staying a 
preliminary injunction of ballot-access requirements for third-party candidates would 
require plaintiffs to violate stay-at-home orders); Tex. All. for Retired Ams. v. Hughs, 
976 F.3d 564 (5th Cir. 2020) (staying a preliminary injunction of the elimination of 
straight-ticket voting). 
 337. See, e.g., Thompson v. Dewine, 959 F.3d 804, 811–12 (6th Cir. 2020); Tully, 977 
F.3d at 615–16. 
 338. Compare Tex. All. for Retired Ams., 976 F.3d at 568, with A. Philip Randolph 
Inst. of Ohio v. Larose, 831 F. App’x 188, 192 (6th Cir. 2020), and Common Cause R.I., 
970 F.3d at 17. 
 339. See Mi Familia Vota v. Abbott, 834 F. App’x 860, 863 (5th Cir. 2020); Tex. All. 
for Retired Ams., 976 F.3d at 568. 
 340. See Tex. Democratic Party, 961 F.3d at 411–12. 
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interest factors. 341   There is confusion as to the Purcell principle’s 
application, and the Supreme Court’s lack of guidance contributed to 
the variation in the circuit courts’ reasoning.  This line is particularly 
blurred when court orders will actually lessen voter confusion.342  Some 
circuit court decisions helped to prevent voter confusion, which was the 
primary consideration in the Purcell opinion.343  The circuit courts did 
not uniformly apply the Purcell principle, which can confuse plaintiffs 
bringing claims against election laws close to the date of an election.344 
D. A Confusing, Gaping Hole in Voting Rights Protections 
The current application of the Purcell principle and state emergency 
powers doctrine relinquishes the Supreme Court’s role in adjudicating 
requests for preliminary relief from election laws.345  By refusing to 
rule on the merits in emergency relief cases, the Court has retracted 
judicial protections of the right to vote.  This reasoning moves away 
from a balancing test and towards a strict rule that, close to elections, 
grants state legislatures full control over election laws, subject to little 
to no substantive judicial review.346  Lower courts are following the 
Supreme Court’s lead and using a bright-line rule based on the 
proximity of the elections.347  This Note does not argue that all of these 
cases are incorrectly decided, but rather that the bright-line rule against 
intervening in election procedures close to Election Day prevents 
courts from deciding these claims on the merits and permits 
constitutional abuses. 
An example from Georgia’s 2021 Senate runoff elections 
underscores the importance of this.  In Hall County, officials opened 
several early voting locations for the 2020 general election to 
 
 341. See Larose, 831 F. App’x at 192; Org. for Black Struggle v. Ashcroft, 978 F.3d 
603, 609 (8th Cir. 2020); Thompson, 959 F.3d at 813.  
 342. See Common Cause R.I., 970 F.3d at 17 (“[I]n the absence of the consent 
decree, it is likely that many voters will be surprised when they receive ballots, and far 
fewer will vote.”). 
 343. See id. (“Because of the unusual — indeed in several instances unique — 
characteristics of this case, the Purcell concerns that would normally support a stay are 
largely inapplicable, and arguably militate against it.”). 
 344. See infra Section III.A. 
 345. See Joshua A. Douglas, Courts Are Supposed to Protect the Right to Vote. 
Why Aren’t They?, CNN (Oct. 14, 2020, 7:51 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/14/opinions/courts-not-protecting-voting-rights-
douglas/index.html [https://perma.cc/U9RL-CERP]. 
 346. Compare Section I.A.i (explaining the Anderson-Burdick balancing test), with 
Part II (exploring the use of the Purcell principle’s bright-line rule against judicial 
intervention). 
 347. See supra Section II.B. 
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accommodate COVID-19 concerns.348  Murrayville Library was one of 
eight early voting sites opened to prevent the spread of COVID-19 and 
ensure compliance with social distancing guidelines.349  In Gainesville, 
Black and Latinx workers at the Fieldale Farms poultry plant relied on 
the Murrayville Library, which was just a four-minute drive away, to 
vote in the 2020 general election.350  However, with the COVID-19 
pandemic growing exponentially worse in December 2020, the 
Murrayville Library and the three other sites were closed ahead of the 
2021 Georgia Senate runoff elections.351 
Georgia law, which mandates that citizens have two hours to vote on 
their lunch breaks,352 and limited public transportation caused Fieldale 
Farms workers to rely on nearby polling places to vote.353  These four 
poll site closures disproportionately affected working-class Black and 
Latinx voters like those at the Fieldale Farms plant, potentially forcing 
them to vote on Election Day and expose themselves to COVID-19.354  
In response, LatinoJustice and other public interest organizations 
wrote a letter to Hall County election officials warning them that its 
early voting site closures would make it “difficult, if not impossible, for 
many Latino and Black voters” in Hall County to cast their ballots 
before Election Day.355  The letter went on to say that the “elimination 
of half of Hall County’s advance voting locations disproportionately 
impact[ed] Hall County’s Latino and Black voters and expose[d] Hall 
County to litigation.”356 
The letter supported this assertion with direct evidence of decreased 
voter turnout in Hall County for the runoff elections.357  Over the first 
two days of early voting in the 2020 general election, Hall County was 
among Georgia’s counties with the highest voter turnout. 358   In 
 
 348. See Mansoor, supra note 35. 
 349. See id. 
 350. See id. 
 351. See id. 
 352. See GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-404 (West 2021). 
 353. See Mansoor, supra note 35. 
 354. See id. 
 355. Letter from Kira Romero-Craft, Managing Att’y, LatinoJustice PRLDEF et al., 
to Richard Higgins, Chairman, Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs et al. 4 (Dec. 16, 2020) 
[hereinafter Dec. 16 Letter], https://www.naacpldf.org/wp-content/uploads/December-
16-2020-Letter-Re-Closure-of-Early-Vote-Sites-in-Hall-County.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q8F3-TJCD]. 
 356. Id. 
 357. See id. at 2. 
 358. See id. (citing Voter Absentee Files, GA. SEC’Y STATE, 
https://elections.sos.ga.gov/Elections/voterabsenteefile.do [https://perma.cc/G65K-
D2LL] (last visited Feb. 26, 2021)). 
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contrast, for the runoff elections, Hall County dropped to among the 
counties with the lowest voter turnout over the first two days of early 
voting.359  The poll closures may have created confusion among voters 
in Hall County, many of whom likely anticipated voting at the same 
location they voted in the general election less than two months 
earlier.360  Not only is this a ballot access issue, but it is also an issue 
regarding the health of marginalized communities.361   Marginalized 
communities are disproportionately more likely to get COVID-19,362 
and forcing them to wait in long lines to vote on Election Day further 
increased this risk.363 
The letter urged Hall County to maintain at least eight early voting 
locations so that the county would not violate Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act 364  and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.365  Hall County election officials stated that they reduced 
the number of early voting sites because they did not have enough poll 
workers to operate more early voting sites.366  The organizations that 
sent the letter retorted by offering to help provide and train poll 
workers if the county had a shortage.367  Hall County did not end up 
taking any action in response to this letter.368  The number of early 
votes as a percentage of all votes cast in Hall County decreased from 
61.3% in the general election to just 38.5% in the runoff elections.369 
 
 359. See id. 
 360. See Mansoor, supra note 35. 
 361. See id. 
 362. See, e.g., Daniel Wood, As Pandemic Deaths Add Up, Racial Disparities 
Persist — and in Some Cases Worsen, NPR (Sept. 23, 2020, 1:01 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/09/23/914427907/as-pandemic-deaths-
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WDHE]; Ethnic Minorities Disproportionately Affected by Coronavirus: Study, 
REUTERS (Nov. 12, 2020, 7:57 PM) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-
coronavirus-minorities/ethnic-minorities-disproportionately-affected-by-coronavirus-
study-idUSKBN27T03G [https://perma.cc/YZ7J-K6MZ]. 
 363. See Mansoor, supra note 35. 
 364. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits voting practices or procedures that, 
based on the “totality of the circumstance of the local electoral process,” have the 
result of denying or diluting a racial or language minority an equal opportunity to 
participate in an election. See Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 
(Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/crt/section-2-voting-rights-act 
[https://perma.cc/UD6X-M5B9] (citing S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (1982)). 
 365. See Dec. 16 Letter, supra note 355, at 4. 
 366. See Mansoor, supra note 35. 
 367. See id. 
 368. See Telephone Interview with Michael Pernick, Att’y, NAACP Legal Def. 
Fund (Dec. 30, 2020). 
 369. Compare Georgia Early Voting Statistics, U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT (Nov. 5, 
2020), https://electproject.github.io/Early-Vote-2020G/GA.html 
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Hall County’s citizens should be able to seek judicial review to 
determine whether county policies result in unconstitutional 
disenfranchisement.  If a court determines that the plaintiffs have a 
meritorious claim, the court should be able to intervene and prevent 
such unconstitutional actions.  However, because Hall County officials 
made such decisions within two months of Election Day, a court may 
rely on the Purcell principle and merely defer to state officials’ 
decisions.  If state officials know the court will give absolute deference 
to the state’s decision, officials can act without oversight and the threat 
of litigation will be moot.370  Stressing the proximity of the election so 
heavily takes away the greatest weapon in the voting rights advocate’s 
arsenal: litigation. 371   There is a hole in voting rights protections 
because, under the Purcell principle, courts could refuse to grant 
judicial relief for claims regarding unconstitutional election 
administration decisions within two months of Election Day, even if 
such claims have merit. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has not clearly articulated the bounds 
of the Purcell principle and merged it with deference to state power 
over elections and emergency powers.372  The Purcell opinion warned 
lower courts about the potential voter confusion caused by court orders 
decided close to Election Day.373  The Court then applied the Purcell 
principle as a bright-line rule against intervening in elections close to 
Election Day. 374   Additionally, the Court has not articulated any 
exceptions to the Purcell principle. 375   Without much guidance on 
applying the Purcell principle, lower courts, unsurprisingly, do not 
apply it uniformly.376  The fact that neither Justice Kavanaugh nor 
Justice Gorsuch went through the traditional factors for staying an 
order in Andino or vacating a stay in Wisconsin State Legislature lends 
credence to the deduction that the factors are irrelevant when applying 
the Purcell principle.377  Lastly, the Court has never defined how close 
to an election is too close.  For example, the Court has applied the 
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 370. See infra Section III.C. 
 371. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 372. See supra Section II.B. 
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 374. See supra Section II.A. 
 375. See supra Sections II.A–B. 
 376. See supra Section II.C. 
 377. See supra Section II.B. 
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Purcell principle to lower court rulings that arose 61 days before an 
election,378 as well as five days before an election.379  This veritable 
mess of a doctrine leaves a gap in the judicial protection of voting rights 
close to elections. 
III. THE COMBINATION OF PURCELL AND STATE EMERGENCY 
POWERS IS RIPE FOR ABUSE 
By strongly relying on the Purcell principle, the Supreme Court is 
tying lower courts’ hands and preventing them from providing judicial 
relief from unconstitutional burdens on the right to vote.  While the 
Purcell principle is harmful in the context of ordinary elections, the 
additional reliance on the state emergency powers doctrine opens the 
door to potential abuse in future elections.  The Court should articulate 
more explicit boundaries for the Purcell principle and state emergency 
powers. 
Section III.A points out that reliance on the Purcell principle and 
state emergency powers grants considerable power to state legislatures.  
It then analyzes the potential for emergency powers to be abused by 
state legislators or governors for illegitimate reasons and asserts that 
the Supreme Court needs to prevent state governments from 
improperly intervening in elections.  Section III.B argues that the 
Court should clearly articulate the Purcell principle to allow for 
consistent application by lower courts.  This Section then proposes that 
the Court allow plaintiffs to prove that changes to election laws are an 
egregious abuse of state emergency powers and create burdens on the 
right to vote without valid justification.  Section III.C concludes by 
analyzing a hypothetical example under both the existing framework 
and the proposed framework to demonstrate how it protects against 
egregious abuses of state emergency powers. 
 
 378. See Husted v. Ohio State Conference of the NAACP, 573 U.S. 988 (2014). The 
district court decided Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d 
808 (S.D. Ohio 2014), on September 4, 2014, and election day in 2014 was on November 
4, see Election Results. 2014, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Election_results,_2014 [https://perma.cc/JG25-AHNV] (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2021). 
 379. See Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee, 140 
S. Ct. 1205 (2020). The district court decided Democratic National Committee v. 
Republican National Committee, 451 F. Supp. 3d 952 (W.D. Wis. 2020), on April 2, 
2020, and primary election day in Wisconsin was on April 7, 2020, see Wisconsin 
Elections, 2020, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Wisconsin_elections,_2020 
[https://perma.cc/GR4Y-SWE8] (last visited Apr. 8, 2021). 
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A. Fixing the Purcell Principle 
James Madison wrote in Federalist No. 43 that “[t]he only restriction 
imposed on [the States is] that they shall not exchange republican for 
antirepublican Constitutions.”380  To ensure the integrity of elections, 
the Court must carve out an exception to the Purcell principle 
regarding the potential for egregious abuse of state emergency powers 
for undemocratic purposes.  In an emergency, courts should protect 
against practices and procedures that unconstitutionally burden the 
right to vote.  State legislatures and executives are more capable of 
responding to emergencies like a pandemic, but courts must guarantee 
that the responses do not violate the Constitution. 
The Purcell principle is incredibly problematic and prevents 
consideration of cases on the merits close to elections, leaving plaintiffs 
without judicial relief from potential constitutional violations.  This 
issue is heightened in emergencies when the state has greater 
justifications for burdening the right to vote.381  Combining the Purcell 
principle with the state emergency powers doctrine allocates 
tremendous power to state legislatures to administer elections during 
emergencies and ties the courts’ hands in voting rights litigation.382  
State legislatures have the power to create election laws383 and address 
emergencies,384 but that power should be subject to judicial review.  A 
bright-line rule prohibiting judicial review close to Election Day and 
complete deference to state emergency powers opens the door to abuse 
of state powers.  Without a possibility for recourse close to elections, 
voters are vulnerable to egregious abuses of state emergency powers. 
The Supreme Court views legislative branches as better equipped to 
handle public health crises because they are politically accountable to 
the people.385  Nevertheless, legislatures may not be fully accountable 
if they can rewrite the rules of their own elections without substantive 
judicial review close to the election’s date.  If a natural disaster, like a 
hurricane,386 or a terrorist attack387 hits close to Election Day, then 
courts may be powerless to prevent voting rights abuses. 
 
 380. THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison). 
 381. See supra Section I.C.i. 
 382. See supra Part II. 
 383. See U.S. CONST art. I, § 4. 
 384. See Election Emergencies, supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
 385. See South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 
(2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 386. See supra Section I.C.ii. 
 387. See supra Section I.C.ii; see also Jerry H. Goldfeder, Could Terrorists Derail a 
Presidential Election?, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 523, 525 (2005). 
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As demonstrated previously, every case close to an election and a 
state emergency completely defers to state decisions. 388   The 
Constitution grants state legislatures authority to administer elections, 
subject to Congressional oversight and judicial review for 
constitutional rights violations.389  Ensuring the political accountability 
of the decisions made in an emergency is essential to the function of 
democracy.390  Allowing an exception to the Purcell principle and state 
emergency powers doctrine balances the deference to state legislatures 
in making emergency decisions while maintaining fair election 
practices. 
Historically, the Court has been very deferential to the states during 
emergencies, but the Court has stepped in after emergencies to prevent 
future egregious abuses of emergency powers.391  Egregious abuses of 
emergency powers have consisted of prosecuting civilians in military 
tribunals when they were not involved with military service and civilian 
courts were operational, thereby depriving them of their constitutional 
rights to a trial by jury and due process of law.392  An egregious abuse 
of emergency powers in election law, as defined in this Note, involves 
using emergency powers to unconstitutionally inject government into 
the debate over who should govern through decisions that affect the 
right to vote. 
In Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. 
Bennett, 393  the Court struck down a provision of Arizona’s public 
campaign financing system that allowed candidates for state office who 
accepted public funding to receive additional public funding when 
independent expenditure groups spent money for a privately funded 
opponent.394  In its opinion, the Court stated that “‘[l]eveling electoral 
opportunities means making and implementing judgments about which 
strengths should be permitted to contribute to the outcome of an 
election’ . . . .  And such basic intrusion by the government into the 
debate over who should govern goes to the heart of First Amendment 
values.”395 
 
 388. See supra Parts II. 
 389. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4; id. amends. XIV, XV, XVII, XIX, XXVI. 
 390. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“Governments 
are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the 
governed . . . .”). 
 391. See supra Section I.B.i. 
 392. See supra Section I.B.i. 
 393. 564 U.S. 721 (2011). 
 394. See id. at 750–55. 
 395. Id. at 750 (quoting Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 742 (2008)). 
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In McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 396  the Court 
addressed a campaign finance law that restricted how much money a 
donor could contribute in total to all political candidates or 
committees.397  When it struck down this restriction, the Court said, 
“those who govern should be the last people to help decide who should 
govern.”398  Concerns over governmental intrusion into the decision as 
to who should govern are the same concerns that the Court should have 
when states make emergency changes to election laws. 
B. Courts Should Limit the Purcell Principle and                                
State Emergency Powers 
The Supreme Court should look back at the framework it created 
with the Purcell principle and state emergency powers doctrine to 
protect democracy in future emergencies.  Currently, the Supreme 
Court has not outlined circumstances that could overcome the Purcell 
principle.399  Not even a showing of intentional racial discrimination 
was enough to overcome the Purcell principle in one case.400   The 
marriage of the Purcell principle and the state emergency powers 
doctrine makes judicial relief even more unlikely.401  On the one hand, 
the Court is correct: emergencies warrant deference to state 
legislatures.402  However, courts must have the power to review such 
actions.  Suppose that, in response to COVID-19, a state passed an 
emergency order stating that only men could vote because there are 
fears COVID-19 kills more women than men.  This regulation clearly 
would violate the Nineteenth Amendment, which states that “the right 
. . . to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . . by any State on account 
of sex.”403  However, it appears that in this absurd scenario, the Court 
would defer to the state emergency powers and the Purcell principle 
and refuse to grant judicial relief.  This is unacceptable. 
 
 396. 572 U.S. 185 (2014) (plurality opinion). 
 397. See id. at 193–96. 
 398. See id. at 192. 
 399. See supra Sections I.A–B; supra Part II. 
 400. See Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 698–99 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (enjoining 
implementation of voter identification law based on finding of intentional 
discrimination), motion to vacate stay denied, 769 F.3d 890, 892 (5th Cir. 2014), motion 
to vacate stay denied, 135 S. Ct. 9, 9 (2014) (mem.); see also supra Section I.A.iii. 
 401. See supra Section II.B. 
 402. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 29–30 
(2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 403. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
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The first thing the Court should do is establish clear boundaries for 
the Purcell principle and remedy the confusion among lower courts.404  
When determining if the Purcell principle applies, the Court should 
provide direction on specific considerations regarding the election’s 
proximity.  The lack of explanation about timing prevents clear 
communication to plaintiffs when the Purcell principle applies. 405  
Additionally, the importance of the proximity of the election may 
differ between cases. 406   For instance, if the deadline for printing 
ballots is one month before the election, then any litigation regarding 
ballot access for a candidate must take place an adequate amount of 
time before printing the ballots.  However, if the challenged procedure 
is, for example, the deadline for casting or receiving absentee ballots, 
then a month out from the election may be ample time to change the 
necessary procedures.  The Court needs to explain these considerations 
to ensure consistent application of the Purcell principle across the 
circuits. 
Furthermore, the Court must make clear how the Purcell principle 
applies in the procedure for analyzing requests for preliminary relief or 
stays pending appeal.  Currently, lower courts are applying the 
principle inconsistently, making it confusing for plaintiffs to litigate.407  
If plaintiffs do not know which of the preliminary injunction factors or 
Nken factors the principle applies to, then any litigation becomes more 
difficult.408  Additional explanation is needed in order to uniformly 
apply the Purcell principle across the circuit courts. 
Moreover, the Court must clarify a distinction between courts’ 
power to overrule election laws and the constraints on that power close 
to Election Day.  Throughout the pandemic, the Court merged the 
Purcell principle with state legislatures’ constitutionally delegated 
power to administer elections under Articles I and II of the 
Constitution 409  without clearly distinguishing between the two 
 
 404. See supra Section II.C. 
 405. See, e.g., Tex. All. for Retired Ams. v. Hughs, 976 F.3d 564, 567 (5th Cir. 2020) 
(ruling that plaintiffs misconstrued when the Purcell principle applies because 18 days 
before early voting begins is too close to the election). 
 406. See Kishore v. Whitmer, 972 F.3d 745, 751 (6th Cir. 2020) (applying the Purcell 
principle even though election officials gave the court a deadline more than a week 
later than when the ruling came down). 
 407. See supra Section II.C. 
 408. Compare Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott, 961 F.3d 389 (5th Cir. 2020) 
(applying the Purcell principle under the “irreparable harm” factor in the analysis of 
stay pending appeal), with Mi Familia Vota v. Abbott, 834 F. App’x 860, 865 (5th Cir. 
2020) (applying the Purcell principle under the “likelihood of success on the merits” 
factor in the stay analysis). 
 409. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
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doctrines. 410   This is particularly evident in Justice Gorsuch’s 
Wisconsin State Legislature concurrence and Moore dissent when he 
used the state election power and the Purcell principle 
interchangeably.411   As a result, lower courts are citing the Purcell 
principle as standing for different propositions.412   Thus, the Court 
needs to clarify if the Purcell principle merely prevents orders that 
create voter confusion or any orders close to elections.413 
Additionally, the Court needs to create an exception to the Purcell 
principle to allow courts to analyze whether it will intervene regarding 
election decisions close to Election Day, especially in cases of 
emergencies.  A bright-line rule against interference prevents the 
Court from granting judicial relief, even if there are constitutional 
violations.  Utilizing the traditional frameworks for considering 
requests for preliminary relief or granting a stay pending appeal, courts 
should add into their analysis specific considerations regarding abuses 
of state emergency powers. 
If the plaintiff can establish that the challenged procedure 
constitutes a burden on the right to vote, then the courts should allow 
plaintiffs to argue that the state’s proffered justifications for that 
burden are not warranted or are invalid, even in times of an emergency.  
In the context of elections, the responses must be done in good faith 
and must preserve access to the franchise.  The substitution of free and 
fair elections with those in which the government injects itself towards 
one party is analogous to the substitution of civilian courts with military 
tribunals.414  The manipulation of election procedures to help decide 
who should govern should be considered an egregious abuse of state 
emergency power, and courts must intervene to prevent this. 
If plaintiffs can prove either of the following, then courts should 
grant the plaintiffs’ requested relief over the justifications of the state.  
First, suppose the plaintiff can prove there is direct intent to burden 
 
 410. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 28–30 
(2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (reasoning that the district court’s relief was so 
extraordinary that “there [is no] precedent for it in 230 years of this Court’s decisions”). 
 411. See id.; Moore v. Circosta, 141 S. Ct. 46, 48 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) 
(“Such last-minute changes by largely unaccountable bodies, too, invite confusion, risk 
altering election outcomes, and in the process threaten voter confidence in the 
results.”). 
 412. Compare Tex. Democratic Party, 961 F.3d at 411 (citing the Purcell principle to 
say that forcing Texas to implement a procedure against its will constituted irreparable 
harm), with Tully v. Okeson, 977 F.3d 608, 618 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing the Purcell 
principle to say that the court is “ill-equipped” to override the state legislature’s 
decision). See generally supra Section II.C. 
 413. See supra Section II.D. 
 414. See supra Section I.B.i. 
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the right to vote for voters to favor one candidate, party, or class of 
voters and improperly attempt to decide who should govern.  In that 
case, the court should not immediately defer to the state’s decision.  
Rather, the court should consider the egregious abuses of state 
emergency power in its decision to intervene in the election.  
Statements by government officials or party members regarding the 
reasons for implementing changes, or refusing to implement changes, 
can be proof of manipulation and abuse of state emergency powers.  
Additionally, the plaintiff may demonstrate that the policies or lack 
thereof intend to benefit one class of voters to the detriment of 
another. 
Second, if the plaintiff can prove that the implemented policies, or 
the refusal to implement policies, burden the right to vote while serving 
no rational purpose or do not further the state’s proffered interest, then 
equitable relief should be granted to the plaintiff.  While a high bar to 
meet, this burden of proof provides a way for plaintiffs to surmount the 
combination of the Purcell principle and state emergency powers 
doctrine.  When the use of state emergency power injects government 
into the debate as to who should govern,415 then courts should strike it 
down.  Allowing an exception to the Purcell principle and state 
emergency powers doctrine, although intended to be rarely granted, 
allows courts to protect against egregious abuses of state power. 
C. Analyzing the Georgia 2022 Election Hypothetical Under the 
Egregious Abuse of State Emergency Power Framework 
Consider the following example of a hypothetical 2022 gubernatorial 
election in Georgia to demonstrate the implications of the Purcell 
principle and the state emergency powers doctrine.  Joe Biden won 
Georgia by a razor-thin margin in the 2020 presidential election,416 
which results in a hotly contested 2022 gubernatorial election.  In 2020, 
President Biden had narrowly beat out President Trump’s lead in 
Georgia due primarily to absentee ballots,417 and Democratic voters 
 
 415. Cf. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 192 (2014) (holding 
that campaign finance regulations that pursue objectives other than the preventing 
quid pro quo corruption or its appearance impermissibly inject government “into the 
debate over who should govern” (quoting Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC 
v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 750 (2011))). 
 416. See Georgia Presidential Election Results 2020, NBC NEWS (Feb. 3, 2021, 1:15 
PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-elections/georgia-president-results 
[https://perma.cc/VC8M-TBK3]. 
 417. See Stephanie Saul, Biden Is Closing the Gap on Trump in Georgia, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/04/us/politics/biden-is-closing-the-
gap-on-trump-in-georgia.html [https://perma.cc/3V96-YFXE]. 
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were much more likely to vote absentee than Republican voters.418  In 
the 2022 election, incumbent Republican Governor Brian Kemp is 
running for reelection.419 
Imagine that a month and a half before the 2022 election, a massive 
hurricane strikes the east coast, devastating Georgia and destroying 
many of the planned polling places for the upcoming elections.  In 
response to the emergency, Georgia’s emergency statute grants 
Governor Kemp power to suspend regulatory statutes, including 
election laws.420  Governor Kemp publicly states Georgia will not have 
enough poll workers and resources to open new polling sites in every 
county and thus will not open new sites in selected counties.  Although 
the Governor leaves this out of the public statement, the only counties 
with new poll sites are ones in which President Trump won at least 60% 
of the vote in 2020. 421   Not only that, but the Governor says that 
Georgia will only give out and count absentee ballots from these 
counties and does not have the resources to administer and count all 
the absentee ballots.  Therefore, it will not disseminate no-excuse 
absentee ballots or allow displacement from the hurricane to be used 
as an excuse.422   As a result, Georgia voters in densely populated, 
heavily Democratic counties — such as Fulton, Gwinnett, Cobb, 
Chatham, and Dekalb — and competitive counties like Houston and 
Lowndes have very few polling places and no other viable alternative 
to vote in the wake of the hurricane. 
These decisions inflame voting rights groups across Georgia, who 
sue in federal court for a preliminary injunction and writ of mandamus, 
forcing the Governor to open new polling locations in these counties 
and allow all voters to cast absentee ballots.  A federal district court in 
Georgia grants the preliminary injunction on the grounds that these 
restrictions violate voters’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights 
under the Anderson-Burdick test.423  Its injunction forces the state to 
 
 418. Almost 850,000 Georgia absentee voters voted for President Biden compared 
to about 450,000 for President Trump. See Christopher Alston, Georgia’s Absentee 
Voting Policies That Benefited Democrats Were Created by Republicans, WABE 
(Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.wabe.org/absentee-voting-policies-in-georgia-that-
benefited-democrats-were-originally-created-by-republicans/ 
[https://perma.cc/8CUA-43U4]. 
 419. See Brian Kemp, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Brian_Kemp 
[https://perma.cc/G9QS-YNW5] (last visited Mar. 1, 2021). 
 420. See GA. CODE ANN. § 38-3-51 (West 2014); see also Election Emergencies, 
supra note 187. 
 421. See Georgia Presidential Election Results 2020, supra note 416. 
 422. Cf. King, supra note 25 (discussing an attempt by Georgia’s Governor to restrict 
access to absentee ballots during the COVID-19 pandemic due to a lack of resources). 
 423. See supra Section I.A. 
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accept absentee ballots for all voters and open one new polling place 
per 10,000 residents in each county that did not have reopened poll 
sites.  The Eleventh Circuit, relying on the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
in Wisconsin State Legislature,424 stays the district court’s injunction.  
The plaintiffs then appeal to the Supreme Court, which refuses to 
vacate the stay and reiterates its framework, combining the Purcell 
principle and the state emergency powers doctrine.  Since the 
legislature acted with emergency power due to the hurricane and the 
election is now less than a month away, the Court refuses to intervene.  
The Court cites its previous emergency election law cases425 and says it 
is not the place of the Court to second-guess decisions of the politically 
accountable branches of state governments. 
Consequently, on the day of the election, hundreds of thousands of 
voters displaced by the hurricane have to wait all day to vote on 
Election Day.  Many are unable to vote due to excessively long lines.  
Moreover, election officials reject hundreds of thousands of absentee 
ballots for not falling within the valid excuses.  The limitation of polling 
places is particularly burdensome in Atlanta, where several counties 
have more than half a million residents but only one poll site. 426  
Georgia’s most populous counties are heavily made up of Black 
Americans and vote overwhelmingly Democratic.427  As a result, these 
restrictions disenfranchise thousands of voters, particularly 
Democrats.  The election results in a landslide victory for the 
incumbent Republican Governor Kemp, who first enacted such 
restrictive policies. 
This hypothetical demonstrates the extent to which reliance on the 
Purcell principle and the state emergency powers doctrine allow for 
abuse of state emergency powers close to elections.  During 
emergencies, voters may receive no relief from blatant attempts to 
restrict access to the ballot, even when there are clear partisan 
motivations behind them.  The Court should maintain limitations on 
that power to ensure free and fair elections.  By foregoing any judicial 
review close to elections, the Supreme Court is abdicating its primary 
 
 424. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28 (2020); see also 
supra Section II.B.ii. 
 425. See supra Part II. 
 426. See Georgia Counties by Population, GA. DEMOGRAPHICS, 
https://www.georgia-demographics.com/counties_by_population 
[https://perma.cc/MY8G-9VMZ] (last visited Mar. 1, 2021). 
 427. See David Weigel, How Votes Shifted in the Six Political States of Georgia, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/georgia-senate-political-
geography/ [https://perma.cc/BY8K-6H6R]. 
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responsibility: protecting U.S. citizens against violations of their 
constitutional rights. 
When analyzing this hypothetical within the new framework 
outlined in Section III.B, the judicial analysis changes.  After a 
hurricane, state emergency powers take effect and increase the state’s 
power to implement changes to election laws.428  In the suit challenging 
the relocation and reopening of polling places in predominantly white, 
Republican-dominated counties and the refusal to accept absentee 
ballots from those displaced by the hurricane, the plaintiffs can prove 
an egregious abuse of state power.429 
First, the plaintiffs must prove that the changes — or lack thereof — 
to election laws burden their right to vote.430  Then, the plaintiffs must 
show that the use of state power was egregious by injecting the 
government into the debate as to who should govern.  If the plaintiffs 
can show that the state has enough poll workers, in contrast to the 
Governor’s claim, to open new polling locations in the affected 
counties, then the state’s justification for burdening the right to vote is 
suspect.  The state may argue that it did not have the resources to open 
them due to the hurricane.  However, the plaintiffs may prove that the 
state did not allocate its resources proportionately, concentrating them 
in certain counties, and that it has access to more resources than it is 
employing.  Proving this demonstrates that the state is improperly 
abusing its emergency powers and inequitably facilitating the right to 
vote in the gubernatorial election. 
Moreover, the plaintiffs could argue that opening new polling places 
only in counties that voted for President Trump by 60% demonstrates 
an improper abuse of state emergency power.  The plaintiffs may argue 
that the primary reason to open new polling places in only those 
counties is to promote the Governor’s electoral prospects.431  Had the 
government spread them out in proportion to the population in each 
county, this would have facilitated voting across the state.  As a result, 
the inequitable distribution of polling places and refusal to employ 
enough poll workers to service the other counties serves no rational 
purpose and are not explained by the Governor’s justification. 
 
 428. See supra Section I.B. 
 429. See supra Section III.B. 
 430. See supra Section III.B. 
 431. Cf. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968) (“[T]he Ohio laws before us give 
the two old, established parties a decided advantage over any new parties struggling 
for existence and thus place substantially unequal burdens on both the right to vote 
and the right to associate.”). 
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Furthermore, the State’s argument that it cannot administer no-
excuse absentee ballots because it lacks the resources to do so leaves 
thousands of voters without a viable alternative for voting.  If the 
plaintiff shows that the state has the resources to implement this 
procedure, this lends credence to their argument.  Additionally, if the 
plaintiff can demonstrate that they, along with many other voters, will 
have no other viable alternative to vote in the election due to the 
refusal to open new polling places in several counties, this furthers their 
argument.  Moreover, if the plaintiffs can prove that not only does the 
state have enough resources to implement no-excuse absentee voting, 
but also that not doing so would serve to inject the government into the 
debate over who should govern, then the court should provide the 
plaintiffs relief. 
In this hypothetical, the changes to election law through emergency 
powers prevented the free exercise of the franchise and a fair election.  
The Governor’s actions were not justified by his proffered justifications 
and improperly injected government into the debate as to who should 
govern.  The inhibition of a democratic election constitutes an 
egregious abuse of state emergency powers over election law, which 
overcomes the application of Purcell and the state emergency powers 
doctrine in an emergency proceeding. 
If the Court does not formulate a method for a new framework for 
evaluating Purcell and state emergency powers, then this scenario 
could happen in the near future, and courts would have no way to 
prevent impermissible, undemocratic actions.  The exception for 
egregious abuses of state emergency powers is the only way to balance 
both the states’ compelling interests in managing election emergencies 
against access to the franchise and fairness of elections.  The Court 
should ensure political accountability through the maintenance of free 
and fair elections. 
CONCLUSION 
The fear of potentially catching a deadly virus while voting 
engendered a profound change in election processes and procedures 
throughout the United States.  Numerous lawsuits arose trying to 
ensure voters’ safety while enabling access to the ballot in the face of 
COVID-19.432  The Court tried to leave decisions about voter safety up 
to state legislatures because they are politically accountable and have 
 
 432. See Election Litigation: COVID-19 and Emergency Election Litigation, supra 
note 42. 
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the expertise to deal with emergencies. 433   However, the Court’s 
reliance on the Purcell principle and deference to state emergency 
powers allow unconstitutional burdens on the right to vote to continue 
without consideration of cases on the merits.434   Without a way to 
overcome the potential for bad actors to abuse the state legislatures’ 
power over emergency election administration, voters may have no 
way to hold elected officials accountable in an emergency.435   This 
framework aims not to subject every state legislature and executive 
decision regarding elections during an emergency to judicial review.  It 
is merely to provide a backstop against those “[w]icked men, ambitious 
of power, with hatred of liberty and contempt of law”436 from abusing 

















 433. See Part II. 
 434. See supra Parts II, III. 
 435. See supra Part III. 
 436. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 125 (1866). 
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APPENDIX 
Cobb County Advance Voting Sites437 
 
437. Dec. 7 Letter, supra note 28, at 4. 
